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with. 1 Introduction
Given its potential to a⁄ect the real economy, monetary policy has been subject
to intense academic scrutiny over the years in the Economics profession. Popular
wisdom asserts that although ine⁄ective in the longer run, monetary policy is
a powerful tool in in￿ uencing economic activity at shorter horizons and the
New Open Economy Macreoconomics suggests that monetary policy can have
powerful e⁄ects in the long-run as well. According to the stylised fact given
in Christiano et al. (1996), in the US, monetary policy actions impact on the
real sector with an average delay of 4 months and this can persist for up to
2 years. This ￿nding is also borne out in Romer and Romer (1989). Another
salient feature of monetary policy, put forth in Barth and Ramey (2000), is that
small changes in short-term interest rates canresult in large changes in output
(an ampli￿cation e⁄ect). These ￿ndings should be regarded as suggestive rather
than conclusive, as the lag of the pass-through to the real economy appears to
change over time and across countries.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have argued that the mechanism through which
monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real economy is something of a
black box. Attempts at understanding the mechanism has given rise to a large
body of theoretical literature and to a plethora of empirical papers that seek
to match theory with real data. The most traditional explanation for the link
is the interest rate channel developed in textbook IS-LM models. However, the
early observation that the interest rate channel cannot neatly explain output
￿ uctuations has given birth to the credit channel literature (including the bank
lending, the broad lending, the bank capital channel and the role of trade credit).
Finally, asset prices, such as the exchange rate and stock prices, are also believed
to constitute a bridge between nominal and real variables and this has had
important policy implications in terms of what variables enter a central bank￿ s
interest rate rule when targeting in￿ ation.
In this paper we analyze the separate functioning of the di⁄erent chan-
nels, and we also highlight possible interlinkages between the di⁄erent channels
through which they may magnify or counteract each others￿in￿ uence in the
monetary transmission mechanism (see Figure 1). We have a special emphasis
on transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and there are,
at least, two important reasons why the monetary transmission mechanism of
these economies is worth studying. First, a genuine and precise understanding
of how fast, and to what extent, a change in the central bank￿ s interest instru-
ment modi￿es in￿ ation lies at the heart of in￿ ation targeting. An increasing
number of transition countries already make use of in￿ ation targeting, or have
recently started using it, or are planning to do so. Second, the forthcoming
full euro area participation of the countries that entered the EU in May 2004
raises the issue of whether the already heterogeneous euro area, in terms of the
monetary transmission mechanism, would grow even more heterogeneous. But
a more important question is: will the ECB be e¢ cient in in￿ uencing prices and
real variables when the new EU member states adopt the euro?
Despite the importance of this question, the empirical literature dealing
2with Central and Eastern Europe appears to be fragmented, in the sense that
di⁄erent aspects of the MTM are analysed separately and the big picture is
hidden behind the individual studies. This paper makes an attempt to bring
together di⁄erent branches of the literature. In particular, we take stock of
the empirical issues relating to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and
present them in a systematic way. In addition, we direct attention to potential
pitfalls in the literature and assess the relative importance and the potential
development of the di⁄erent channels1.
Given the large gap in terms of ￿nancial sector development that distin-
guishes CEE from euro area countries, it is of fundamental importance to eval-
uate whether the monetary transmission operates di⁄erently and whether a
homogeneous approach to monetary policy for CEE and euro area countries
may lead to sharply di⁄erent e⁄ects on the respective economies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
development of the monetary policy framework in transition economies. Sections
3 to 6 survey the theoretical literature and summarise the empirical ￿ndings
for the CEE transition economies for the interest channel, the credit channel,
the exchange rate channel and the asset price channel, respectively. Section 7
analyses studies based on the VAR methodology. Finally, Section 8 concludes
by speculating on possible future developments of the di⁄erent channels.
2 A Brief Overview of the Final and Intermedi-
ate Objectives of Monetary Policy in Transi-
tion Economies
To fully understand how the monetary transmission mechanism has evolved in
CEE countries over the past twenty years, and how it works now, it is necessary
to review the development of the monetary policy framework, on which central
banks in Central and Eastern Europe relied at the time economic transition was
launched and during the subsequent transition period.
Generally, the profound economic transformation which occurred in the late
1980s and early 1990s involved, among others, a liberalisation of prices and
trade, which resulted in a surge of very high in￿ ation and large external imbal-
ances. This is why most central banks had at that time more than one ￿nal
objective for their macroeconomic policy, such as the pursuit of price stabil-
ity and external stability. However, over time, the most advanced countries
of the region adopted a single price stability goal (Czech Republic, Hungary or
Poland), while others still today have a dual objective (Croatia). Countries with
large credibility problems introduced currency board arrangements either at an
early stage (Estonia and Lithuania) or after a banking crisis (Bulgaria). Hence,
the ￿nal and the intermediate objectives of these central banks are reduced to
securing the proper functioning of the currency board.
1It should be noted that the coverage of the di⁄erent channels in the paper is not
balanced because some areas are more researched than others.
3Prior or at the time of the transition process, central banks relied on a
monetary aggregate (e.g. Hungary, 1987-1991) as intermediate target. How-
ever, it quickly became clear that money demand functions are unstable when
fundamental changes occur in the real economy and in the monetary policy
framework2. Hence, most central banks of the region switched to the nomi-
nal exchange rate (Hungary, Poland) or to the real exchange rate (Slovenia)
as an intermediate objective. Alternatively, some countries adopted a double
intermediate objective by complementing monetary aggregates with the nom-
inal exchange rate (Czechoslovakia, and after its split-up in 1993, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia). With the move of some countries to in￿ ation targeting
(the Czech Republic and Poland), these intermediate objectives were replaced
by in￿ ation forecasts.
The transformation of the monetary policy framework went hand in hand
with changes in monetary policy instruments as well. Because of the absence
of ￿nancial markets, and because the long prevailing soft budget constraint in
the banking sector and in the non-￿nancial corporate sector economic agents
were insensitive to interest rate signals. Instead direct administrative measures
such as credit ceilings, direct interest rate control and reserve requirements were
being used to control credit growth and banking sector liquidity. Some countries
like Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania have, until recently, been heavily reliant on
these direct measures to curb, for example, credit growth (marginal reserve
requirements on the growth of FX denominated loans)
However, with the development of the interbank money market, indirect
instruments based on the proper functioning of markets were introduced. In
particular, central banks started to in￿ uence very short-term interest rates by
imposing an interest corridor, which is typically maintained by means of open
market operations.
2There is an ongoing debate on the stability of money demand functions in transi-
tion economies. Some backward looking studies argue that money demand was stable
in transition economies like Hungary and Poland (Buch, 2001), in a panel of 6 CEECs
(Chowdhury and Fidrmuc, 2004), and, perhaps surprisingly, for Albania (Kalra, 1998),
Belarus (Pelipas, 2005) and Mongolia (Slłk, 2002). Dabu￿ inskas (2005) provides some
evidence for an instable money demand function in Estonia. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, at the time of the adoption of new monetary policy frameworks in the early
1990s and at later stages of transition, policymakers faced large uncertainty as to
whether money demand will remain stable after the change (NemØnyi, 1996; and
Kokoszczi· nski, 1996). In addition, in some cases, money demand functions can best
be modelled by means of the Cagan model, which links money demand to in￿ ation-
ary expectations (see Slvavova (2003) for Bulgaria, Choudhry (1998) for Russia and
Budina et al. (2002) for Romania) or the interest rate (beside output the most im-
portant determinants of standard money demand functions) turns out to play no role
in Latvia (Tillars, 2004) or in Mongolia (Slłk, 2002). Large shifts in monetary policy
admittedly yields di⁄erent functional forms of money demand (Slavova, 2003). Also,
some authors point out that the process of dollarisation or de-dollarisation may also
explain why money demand function is found unstable in some countries (Oomes and
Ohnsorge, 2005). A ￿nal cautionary note is that money demand estimations tend to
be unreliable not only for transition economies but also in general (Knell and Stix,
2003)
4Figure 1. Overview of the Transmission Mechanism
53 The Interest Rate Channel and the Transmis-
sion Process
The interest rate channel, encapsulated in the traditional IS-LM model, can be
dissected into two distinct stages: (a) the transmission from short-term nomi-
nal interest rates to long-term real interest rates, and (b) the channel through
which aggregate demand and production are a⁄ected by real interest rate de-
velopments.
3.1 First Stage: Interest Rate Pass-Through
3.1.1 Theoretical Aspects
Crucial to the e⁄ectiveness of any monetary policy action is how changes in the
key monetary policy rate are transmitted, ￿rst, onto market rates at the longer
end of the maturity spectrum, and, second, how bank deposit and lending rates
are a⁄ected by such a change in market rates.
The connection between short- and long-term (market) nominal interest
rates is provided by the term structure of interest rates. The slope and the
dynamics of the term structure can best be explained using a combination of
standard theories, such as the liquidity preference view (that is, investors re-
quire a liquidity premium for holding less liquid (usually long-term) assets or
market segmentation (that is, short-term and long-term interest rates could be
determined independently in segmented markets). But most importantly, it is a
widely held view that the expectation conjecture is at the heart of the shape of
the yield curve. According to this position, long-term interest rates are obtained
as an average of expected future short-term interest rates. So, expectations as
to whether, say, an interest rate hike is high enough to curb in￿ ation will domi-
nate the yield curve. This is often referred to as the expectation channel, which
also plays an important role in the asset price and exchange rate channels.
Another facet of the transmission is how interest rate changes in the money
and capital markets in￿ uence bank deposit and loan interest rates. The connec-
tion between market rates and bank lending can be illustrated using a marginal
cost pricing model, where the price set by the bank ( iB) equals the marginal
cost of funding approximated by a market interest rate (iM) and a constant
mark-up (￿) (deBondt, 2002):
iB = ￿ + ￿ ￿ iM (1)
The pass-through parameter ￿ is equal to 1 under perfect competition and
complete information. However, full (or perfect or complete) pass-through may
not prevail if markets are imperfect and in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. In particular, the degree of pass-through crucially hinges on whether
or not the elasticity of demand for deposits and for loans to the deposit and
lending rate, respectively, is 1. Demand elasticities lower than one result in
an incomplete pass-through ( ￿ < 1), and a combination of factors may cause
6the demand elasticities to become less than unity. First, the imperfect substi-
tution between bank deposits and other investment facilities bearing the same
maturity and ￿ exibility (money market funds, T-bills and alike) on the one
hand, and between bank lending and other types of external ￿nance (equity or
bond markets) reduces demand elasticities: a low degree of competition between
banks and between banks and non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries lowers the sen-
sitivity of demand for deposits and loans to the interest rate. Second, demand
elasticities may be reduced if it is costly to change bank (switching costs). In
addition, market segmentation due to switching costs and a high concentration
of the banking sector can lead to monopolistic market structure preventing the
pass-through to be unity.
The presence of asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral haz-
ard) may render bank lending rates less responsive to changes in the key rate.
At the same time, the interest rate pass-through to lending rates can exceed 1
(overshooting) in the event that banks charge higher interest rates in an attempt
to counteract higher risks resulting from asymmetric information, rather than
reducing the supply of loan (deBondt, 2002).
If competition is weak, the interest rate pass-through may vary over the in-
terest rate cycle. When interest rates are on the rise, banks may adjust their
lending rates quicker than their deposit rates. Conversely, if interest rates are
falling, they may tend to decrease their deposit rates more rapidly than their
lending rates (Hannan and Berger, 1992 and Weth, 2002). Sander and Kleimeier
(2004a) stress that the degree of competition is more important for the pass-
through for deposit rates than for lending rates, since problems related to asym-
metric information are less important for the former.
In addition to this, the pass-through from the policy rate to retail rates may
not only be incomplete in the long-run, but could be sluggish in the short-run
due to an array of other factors. First, banks respond slowly to changes in the
market rates in the presence of adjustment or menu costs. They may decide to
adjust lending rates less frequently but when they do adjust the movement is
substantial.Second, the way in which banks adjust their lending rates depends
on the maturity mismatch of their loan and deposit portfolio. The more long-run
loans are covered by long-term deposits, the less pressure banks feel to adjust
their lending rates. In other words, it matters how responsive their liability side
to market rates is. Banks with extensive recourse to long-run deposit such as
saving deposits which are not particularly a⁄ected by market rates, are slower to
adjust their lending rates as compared to those banks whose liability side relies
more heavily on deposits or other forms of ￿nancing, which are more sensitive
to market rates (Weth, 2002).
Third, if banks have long-term relationships with their customers, they may
want to smooth interest rate changes. This may apply to universal banks and
the so-called ￿Hausbank￿ .
Finally, macroeconomic conditions may also have a bearing on the the pass-
through mechanism. For example, during periods of rapid economic growth,
i.e. under favourable economic conditions, banks may ￿nd it easier to pass on
changes in the interest rate to their lending and deposit rates more rapidly.
7Higher in￿ ation may also favour more rapid interest rate pass-through given
that prices may be adjusted more frequently in a high-in￿ ation regime than as
compared to a low-in￿ ation regime. Increased uncertainty, re￿ ected in higher
interest rate volatility may, however, lower the interest rate pass-through as
banks may want to get a true picture of the underlying position.
Importantly, the pass-through to loan rates is intimately related to the credit
market in general and to the functioning of the credit channel in particular. As
we will argue later in this paper, disequilibrium in the credit market may either
diminish the completeness of the pass-through or may help in moving towards
full pass-through. A related issue worth mentioning here is how easily banks can
re￿nance themselves. Banks (usually smaller banks) for which external ￿nancing
is more di¢ cult to access to - because of asymmetric information problems -
increase their deposit rates to attract more deposits, and, consequently, they
also adjust their lending rates3. By the same token, more liquid and more
capitalised banks adapt their retail rates slower to changes in the monetary
policy rate than less liquid banks with less capital (Gambacorta, 2004).
3.1.2 Methodological and Empirical Issues
In practice, the interest rate pass-through is usually investigated using an error
correction model of the following form provided the interest rate series are I(1)
processes and are cointegrated:
￿iB
t = ￿0 + ￿(iB
t￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿iM
t￿1) + ￿￿iM
t + ￿t (2)
where ￿ is the long-run pass-through and ￿ measures contemporaneous ad-
justment. If contemporaneous adjustment is below 1, adjustment is said to be
sluggish. The lag length with which the retail rate ( iB
t ) fully adjusts to the
long-run pass-through ( ￿) is given by the expression: (1 ￿ ￿)=j￿j. 4
3However, as it will be discussed at a later stage, membership to a larger network of
banks may ease the external ￿nance constraint and thus will decrease the sensitivity
of deposit and loan rates to changes in market rates.
4Equation (2) can be extended to a general ARDL model to account for more
short-term dynamics as in equation (3):
￿iB
t = ￿0 + ￿(iB
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8Equation (2) can also be enhanced with the addition of two types of asym-
metries:
a.) Size asymmetry: the speed of adjustment to equilibrium may depend on
the size of the deviation: the higher the deviation from equilibrium the quicker
the adjustment.
b.) Sign asymmetry: ￿rst, the speed of adjustment di⁄ers depending on
whether the deviation occurs above or below equilibrium. Second, sign asym-
metry may be also interpreted in terms of the direction of changes in the key
policy rate as a decrease in the policy rate may have a di⁄erent impact on the
pass-through than an increase in the policy rate.
There are three main strands in the literature depicted in Figure 2, which
relate to the choice of the explanatory interest rate variable in equations (2)
to (4). One strand tests how market interest rates are transmitted into retail
bank interest rates of comparable maturity. This approach is termed the cost
of funds approach (deBondt, 2002).
A second strand directly tests the impact of changes in the interest rate
controlled by monetary policy on retail rates. Sander and Kleimeier (2004) call
this as the monetary policy approach.
A third unifying approach includes two stages: a.) the pass-through from
monetary policy rate to market rates (iMP ! iM) and b.) the transmission from
market rates to retail rates (iM ! iB). These two stages can be incorporated
into an ECM representation as in equation (6) (Berstein and Fuentes, 2003 and



















However, the interpretation of equation (6) in a single-equation setting becomes
di¢ cult when the series are found to be cointegrated. In this kind of set up it
is more appropriate to test separately for the existence of two potential coin-
tegration relationships (iMP ! iM; iM ! iB) using the methods of Johansen
(1995).
Figure 2. The Transmission between Interest Rates
9One di¢ culty with the transmission between interest rates that deserves spe-
cial mention is that the ￿rst stage between monetary policy rates and longer-
term market rates, captured directly by the ￿rst stage of the unifying approach
and indirectly by the monetary policy approach, measures inherently the term
structure. As already noted, the term structure crucially hinges on how ex-
pectations are formed about future in￿ ation and monetary policy￿ s reaction to
in￿ ation. Consequently, the term structure may change over time and may
di⁄er between countries. For a given country, changes in the term structure
may indicate changes in in￿ ation expectations or the progress of disin￿ ation.
Across countries, di⁄erences in the term structure may stem from heterogeneity
about the credibility of monetary policy or weights/preferences given to ￿ghting
in￿ ation (trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and output stabilisation).
There is a large literature aimed at investigating the interest rate pass-
through for euro area countries. DeBondt (2002) and Kleimeier and Sander
(2002) summarise the key ￿ndings of this empirical literature:
1. Bank retail interest rates adjust sluggishly in the short run, especially
overnight and short-term deposit rates and rates on consumer loans. At the
same time, there is some evidence regarding a possible complete pass-through in
the long-run, in particular for short-term corporate loan rates and perhaps also
for housing/mortgage rates. It seems that long-run pass-through is incomplete
for (short-term) deposit rates and consumer loans.
2. However, large amounts of heterogeneity exists both for short-term ad-
justments and for long-run pass-through across the retail interest rate landscape.
3. Ample evidence is found in favour of asymmetric adjustment in the pass-
through process. Nevertheless, no systematic pattern emerges.
4. Although economies of the euro area exhibit substantial heterogene-
ity with regard to the interest rate pass-through, it appears that the pass-
through became faster and more homogeneous after the introduction of the
euro. DeBondt (2002) suggests this was due to increased competition, lower
switching costs and costs associated with asymmetric information and a rise in
the interest rate elasticity of demand for banking products.
3.1.3 Empirical Results for the CEECs
Table 1 summarises the empirical studies carried out for transition economies.
It is worth noting the country coverage for di⁄erent segments of the interest rate
pass-through is unbalanced and there may be concerns relating to the quality
of the data series5. Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be made. First,
it appears that there is a very high or complete pass-through from the key
monetary policy rate to short-term money market rates. The pass-through from
money market rates towards market interest rates of shorter maturity also turns
out to be very high, whereas pass-through to long-term market rates is unstable
mainly because of the change in the yield curve due to successful disin￿ ationary
5Notwithstanding changes in the de￿nition of interest rate series, some authors
(Sander and Kleimeier, 2004) use very long series spanning over 10 years in some
cases, which raises concerns on how to interpret the results.
10policies. This implies that the pass-through from the policy rate to retail rates
occurs not via long-term market rates but rather via shorter-term market rates.
All studies use the one-stage monetary policy approach when studying the
pass-through from market rates to retail interest rates. The results turn out to
be very similar to the ￿ndings for the euro area.
1. The most complete pass-through is typically found for short-term cor-
porate lending rates, followed by long-term corporate loan rates. The lowest
average pass-through is observed for consumer loans. However, it tends to be
higher for the Baltic States and particularly low for the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. For Hungary and Poland, the range is rather large. In general, in-
terest rate charged for new loans tend to react stronger to market conditions
in the long run as compared to old loans. However, somewhat surprisingly, the
opposite holds true for Romania.
2. The pass-through to deposit rates is less complete, with an average long-
run pass-through coe¢ cient of 0.72 for short-term deposits and 0.69 for long-
term deposits. It appears, therefore, that the remuneration of current accounts
and saving accounts incorporates a very low fraction of changes in the market
rates. However, the pass-through of time deposits increases for higher maturi-
ties. Another, and perhaps surprising, observation is that there is no systematic
di⁄erence between the long-run pass-through for interest rates on household and
corporate deposits for Hungary and Poland. In contrast, changes in market rates
are much less transmitted into corporate than into household deposit rates in
Estonia and Latvia.
3. There is substantial cross-country heterogeneity for the long-run pass-
through6. Indeed, heterogeneity is even considerable for the same market in
the same country. Consider, for example, mortgage rates for Lithuania where
the pass-through is complete for the one-year rates and is nearly nil for ￿ve-
year rates. Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) provide some quantitative support
for this view by regressing the estimated pass-through coe¢ cients on country
and market (loans, deposits) dummies. The country dummies turn out to be
signi￿cant. The market dummies con￿rm that short-term and long-term loan
rates are higher and their reaction is swifter, especially when compared to saving
and current accounts. They also ￿nd that the long-run pass-through for corpo-
rate loans is pretty homogeneous. Di⁄erences are, however, to be observed for
the speed of adjustment. ￿gert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2006) also
provide evidence for large heterogeneity across countries and market segments.
They also show that for a number of time series for which error correction mod-
els are estimated in the literature are not cointegrated and the regressions run
for ￿rst di⁄erenced data provide with lower pass-through coe¢ cient estimates.
A major di⁄erence for CEECs compared to the euro area countries is the
weaker evidence in favour of asymmetry in the adjustment process. Sander
and Kleimeier (2004b) conclude that the pass-through process exhibits less
6It is not always clear whether the interest rate series used under the heading ￿long-
run interest rates￿are eventually ￿xed or variables rates for long-run loans or deposits.
However, whatever the composition is, the results indicate how a given composition
reacts to changes in the base or market rates.
11asymmetry in the transition economies. This statement is backed by results
reported in Crespo-Cuaresma, ￿gert and Reininger (2004) and Chmielewski
(2003). Nonetheless, Opiela (1999) ￿nds some asymmetries for Polish bank level
data from 1994 to 1998, and HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2004) for a more re-
cent period for Hungarian deposit and loan rates. ￿gert, Crespo-Cuaresma and
Reininger (2006) ￿nd an increase in asymmetry over time even though the share
remains low and no clear pattern seems to emerge with regard to any speci￿c
country or interest rate series.
Another important feature of interest rate pass-through in Central and East-
ern Europe is that in general, both the contemporaneous and long-run pass-
through is found to increase over time and the mean adjustment lag to full
pass-through to decrease as more recent data can be used (Crespo-Cuaresma,
￿gert and Reininger., 2004; HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di, 2004; and Sander and
Kleimeier, 2004b)7. However, ￿gert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2006)
are more sceptical about this and show that the pass-through was slowing down
in the last couple of years in the CEE-5.
3.1.4 What Are the Main Factors A⁄ecting the Interest Rate Pass-
Through in the CEECs?
A number of researchers have attempted to analyse the factor, or factors, which
may lie behind the size and speed of the pass-through. Three approaches have
been taken. The ￿rst consists of estimating a time series pass-through equation,
such as equations (2) to (5), and including variables such as market concentra-
tion. For example, Wr￿bel and Pawlowska (2002) introduce a monthly indicator
measuring market concentration for deposits and loans (Her￿ndahl-Hirschman
index8) in Poland and show that an increase in concentration reduces the pass-
through for lending rates (as expected) but increases it for deposit rates. Kot
(2004) employs a di⁄erent measure for competition. He argues that if competi-
tion is strong (that is, banks are price takers), the interest rate elasticity of the
demand for products of individual banks is much larger than the interest rate
elasticity of aggregate demand for bank products. Conversely, if banks have
market power and therefore can in￿ uence interest rates, the interest rate elas-
ticity at the individual and at the aggregate level will be closer to one another.
The empirical assessment of the elasticities shows that consumer credit markets
are more competitive in Hungary and in Poland than those in the euro area and
the degree of competition is the lowest in the Czech Republic. The connection
between competition and pass-through is not particularly strong given that the
interest-rate pass-through for consumer credits in Hungary and Poland is com-
parable to that in the euro area, despite harsher competition, while it is lower
in the Czech Republic.
7VilÆgi and Vincze (1998) report very sluggish short-run adjustment and very low
(0.1) long-run pass-through from 30-day and 90-day T-bill rates towards rates on new
corporate loans and short-term corporate deposits for Hungary between 1991 and 1994.
8Alternatively, market concentration could also be measured as the share of the
three or ￿ve biggest banks in terms of loans or deposits in total loans or deposits.
12A second group of papers exploits the cross-sectional dimension of the data
by ￿rst estimating pass-through coe¢ cients using time series for an array of
countries and markets and then by regressing it on a number of explanatory
variables, such as macroeconomic variables and variables related to the structure
of the ￿nancial sector. Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) adopt this approach.
Their results indicate that of the macroeconomic variables, while GDP growth
and ￿nancial depth do not a⁄ect the speed and the size of the pass-through,
higher in￿ ation is associated with a more pronounced pass-through and money
market volatility decreases the pass-through9. As far as variables measuring the
structural features of the ￿nancial sectors, less concentration, less bad loans (a
healthier banking sector) and more foreign participation tend to be associated
with higher and faster pass-through. This result holds for loans as well as for
deposits.
This approach can be extended to bank level data. In such a setting, pass-
through coe¢ cients are estimated for individual banks, and, in the second stage
are regressed on bank-speci￿c features. Opiela (1999) uses this option and
shows that for the period from 1994 to 1998, the pass-through of 37 Polish
banks depends on the ownership (involvement of the State), the share of bad
loans and the degree of capitalisation. In particular, it is demonstrated that
interest rates of State-owned banks respond strongly when interest rates fall,
while these are banks loaded with bad loans, which pass on changes in market
conditions quicker to retail interest rates during periods of rising interest rates.
A third way of proceeding involves combining the time series and cross-
sectional dimensions of the bank-level data by analysing how interest rates of
individual banks react to monetary policy steps and how these steps inter-
act with bank speci￿c characteristics has been investigated in a panel setting.
Berstein and Fuentes (2003) propose estimating a panel model including an in-
teraction term with the share of bad loans, the bank￿ s size (in terms of total
loans, SIZE) and the share of loans to households (as a proxy for the type of
customer, HH).10.
We now turn to the empirical evidence for the transition economies. HorvÆth
et al. (2004) investigate whether interest rate pass-through is heterogeneous
for 25 Hungarian banks and ￿nd for the period from 2001 to 2004 that the
pass-through was homogenous for corporate loan and deposit rates. VÆrhegyi
(2003) examines interest rate pass-through from money market rates to house-
hold deposit rates for a similar dataset (11 Hungarian banks) and sample period
9This stands in contrast with HorvÆth et al. (2004) who ￿nd that higher money




















where BADL denotes bad loands, SIZE is the bank￿ s size (in terms of total loans,
SIZE) and HH refers to the share of loans to households (as a proxy for the type of
customer). Weth (2002) estimates bivariate (market rate and retail rate) panel error
correction models for di⁄erent classes of banks.
13(2000-2003). While the pass-through is incomplete in the long-run for all banks,
some heterogeneity is uncovered for individual banks.
Chmielewski (2004) goes a step beyond studying pass-through at the bank
level and estimates the model used by Weth (2002) for two groups of Polish
banks as a function of whether they are good or bad in terms of: i.) the share
of classi￿ed loans; ii.) capital adequacy ratio; and iii.) pro￿tability captured
by returns on assets (ROA). Perhaps, not surprisingly, more pro￿table banks
adjust household deposit rates for longer maturities and for corporate loan rates
faster than less pro￿table banks. Also, banks with more bad loans are quicker
in adjusting their lending rates and slower in doing so for deposit rate. Finally,
better capitalised banks turn out to react less quickly to market conditions than
less capitalised banks.
To summarise, higher concentration of the banking sector, higher pro￿tabil-
ity and capitalisation of banks typically make banks less receptive in adjusting
their retail rates to the market/policy rates, and hence dampen the interest rate
pass-through. However, this general ￿nding is in con￿ ict with the result that
the ownership structure, especially the involvement of foreigners in the bank-
ing sector may enhance the interest rate pass-through given that more foreign
participation leads to higher concentration, and foreign-owned banks tend to be
more pro￿table and better capitalised.
14Table 1. Long-Run Interest Rate Pass-Through Estimates for the CEECs
Notes: CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, ROM, SK and SI refer to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. HH and COR stand for data series
for households and for the corporate sector, while ALL is the aggregated series. NEW
indicates interest rate series for new loans/deposits, and the ￿gures after ALL, HH and
COR may indicate the precise maturity. CER(2004), HKN (2004), N(2005), SK(2004),
T(2004), V(2003) and WP(2002) are Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004), HorvÆth et al. (2004),
Nickisch (2005), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Tieman (2004), VÆrhegyi (2003) and
Wr￿bel and Pawlowska (2002).
153.2 Second Stage: The Monetary Channel
As we have seen, the ￿rst stage of the monetary transmission concerns inter-
est rate interactions. In what may be thought of as a second stage, the issue
concerns how nominal interest rates impinge on the real sector. Price stickiness
and rational expectations ensure that an innovation in short-term nominal in-
terest rates will lead to moves in both short-term and long-term real interest
rates. Given that real interest rate movements re￿ ect changes in the cost of
capital, corporate investment spending will be a⁄ected. Since they also have a
substantial investment component, spending on housing and durable goods will
also be sensitive to real interest rates. Of course, changes in interest rates entail
two con￿ icting e⁄ects. A rise in interest rate increases the income of holders
of interest bearing assets (income e⁄ect), which can be o⁄set by higher interest
rates favouring savings instead of consumption (substitution e⁄ect). Changes
in investment, housing and durable good spending, i.e. global demand will
eventually cause changes in output.
There are few recent empirical studies investigating this issue. One of them
is Chatelain et al. (2001) who estimate the sensitivity of manufacturing ￿rms￿
investment demand to changes in the user cost of capital (and in sales and
cash-￿ ow). The empirical evidence based on large micro panels indicates that
investment demand in France, Germany, Italy and Spain is sensitive to the
user cost of capital. This gives credit to the money channel to be at work in
these countries. Similar results are reported in KÆtay and Wolf (2004) for the
case of Hungary. Kiss and Vadas (2005) investigate the Hungarian mortgage
market and show that changes in mortgage interest rates have only a limited
in￿ uence on disposable income (income e⁄ect) mainly because of institutional
factors (the government subsidy scheme and the dominitation of ￿xed non-
callable mortgages).
4 Credit Channel
We now turn to the credit channel which is clearly linked to the ￿rst stage
of the interest rate channel, i.e. the interest rate pass-through. According to
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), the traditional interest rate channel performs
poorly as changes in the long-term real interest rate, as a measure of the cost of
capital, appear only weakly related to changes in global demand and thereby fail
to explain the ampli￿cation e⁄ect of short-term interest rates on output. Given
this, they extend the transmission mechanism by introducing the credit channel,
which, they argue, is an enhancement channel that ampli￿es the interest rate
channel. The credit channel can be decomposed into two distinct channels: 1)
the bank lending channel and 2) the broad lending channel (also termed balance
sheet channel or ￿nancial accelerator), which are dealt with subsequently in
what follows.11.
11A detailed overview of the theoretical and empirical literature related to the bank
lending channel can be found in Kierzenkowski (2004).
164.1 Bank Lending Channel
The bank lending channel can be formally modelled by introducing credit into
the product markets in the traditional IS-LM setup (Bernanke and Blinder,
1988), where the IS curve is replaced by the credit-commodity (CC) curve, to
produce the CC-LM model. Central to the bank lending channel is the im-
perfect substitutability between credits and other ￿nancial assets in the banks￿
balance sheet on the one hand, and that between bank credits and other forms
of ￿nancing on ￿rms￿balance sheet, on the other, which makes it possible for
monetary policy to a⁄ect economic activity in two stages.
Imperfect substitution in banks￿assets ensures that a tightening (loosen-
ing) of monetary policy brings about a contraction (expansion) in banks￿credit
supply (the ￿rst stage). When facing a decrease in liquidity12, banks decrease
their credit supply instead of selling bonds they possess because they have a
desired level of liquidity to face, for instance, unexpected deposit withdrawals.
Alternatively, banks could also issue bonds or collect deposits from households
or from the corporate sector rather than decrease credit. However, the ability
of some banks to borrow from ￿nancial markets may be limited by ￿nancial
market imperfections, such as adverse selection and moral hazard (imperfect
substitutability between credits/bonds on the asset side and bonds/deposits on
the liability side).
For monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy, it is necessary
that some ￿rms are not capable of substituting bank credit to other forms
of external funding on the capital markets (imperfect substitutability on the
liability side of ￿rms13). In such a case, once credit supply decreased (increased)
investment spending will be cut back because of the lack of external ￿nancial
resources (second stage).
Underlying the analysis of Bernanke and Blinder are the hypotheses that:
a.) the income elasticities of credit demand and money demand are the same;
and b.) the interest elasticity of credit demand equals that of credit supply.
Kierzenkowski (2005a, 2005b) has recently shown that relaxing, in particular,
hypothesis b.) implies that the bank lending channel need not lead automat-
ically to an ampli￿cation in this framework and can, importantly, also cause
attenuation.
12Bernanke and Blinder assume that the central bank controls the base money and
a tightening (loosening) of the monetary policy decreases (increases) the liquidity of
the banking sector. Alternatively, it is also possible to model monetary policy, which
controls the interest rate. A simple way is to assume the stability of money demand
function, through which a change in the interest rate a⁄ect monetary aggregates. A
more elaborate way is to introduce some kind of monetary policy reaction function,
which links the policy rate to other variables.
13Central to this analysis is the special role banks play in the presence of asymmetric
information, which is widely acknowledged since the seminar articles of Akerlof (1970)
and Fama (1985). In addition to reducing transaction costs (cost of searching, veri￿-
cation and monitoring costs) and transforming maturity, banks are in a good position
to reduce problems related to asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral
hazard), i.e. transforming risk. For a recent general overview on market imperfections,
see DeGennaro (2005).
174.2 Bank Lending Channel14
Imperfect substitution in banks￿assets and in ￿rms￿liabilities, the cornerstone
of the Bernanke-Blinder model, is not necessarily the case. In accordance with
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993), while small banks cannot borrow on ￿nan-
cial markets, larger banks de￿nitely can. Similarly, larger ￿rms have access to
capital markets and can escape bank credit supply contraction. This leads us
to a broader concept, namely to the broad lending channel. The imperfect sub-
stitution no longer exists between bank credits and other ￿nancing but between
external and internal ￿nancing15 where the cost of external ￿nancing is higher
with the external ￿nancing premium, which in turn, primarily depends on net
wealth16 serving as collateral for loans and credits. The higher the net wealth of
the borrower, the lower the external risk premium is mainly because: a.) higher
(expected future) revenues enable one to ￿nance investment internally; and b.)
more valuable collaterals increase safety of the lender, thus decreasing both
moral hazard and adverse selection. Consequently, any change in net wealth
generated directly or indirectly by monetary policy will be re￿ ected in the risk
premium and thus in the capacity to borrow. Monetary policy can in￿ uence net
wealth, via the interest rate, asset price and exchange rate channels described
earlier:
1.) Income e⁄ect (or cash-￿ow channel): an increase (decrease) in
short term interest rates increases (decreases) the cost of servicing short-term
and ￿ oating-rate debt, which reduces (raises) cash-￿ ow and thus net wealth
2.) Debt channel: unexpected rise in in￿ ation makes the real costs of
servicing the debt lower, the terms of which are determined in nominal terms.
3.) Asset price channel 1: an increase (decrease) in short term inter-
est rates lowers (increases) the price of equity, bonds and housing, which thus
directly in￿ uences net wealth.
4.) Asset price channel 2: Wealth and liquidity e⁄ect of households:
monetary policy can impact on household￿borrowing capacity as described in
the asset price channel17
5.) Exchange rate channel: if assets or credits/loans are denominated in
foreign currency, nominal exchange rate developments can increase (decrease)
their value in domestic currency, which also exerts an in￿ uence on borrowing
capacity.
14This channel is also termed ￿nancial accelerator, balance sheet channel or the
borrower net worth channel.
15This contrasts with the Modiglian and Miller theorem on the neutrality of internal
and external funding. Note that in the broad lending channel, banks play no special
role any more as compared to the bank lending channel.
16Net worth or net assets is obtained as total assets minus total liabilities.
17It is noteworthy that both the bank lending channel and the broad lending channel
applies not only to the investment of the non-￿nancial corporate sector but also to
household spending. On the one hand, a fall in credit supply related to consumption
or housing decreases credit to households, which are particularly bank dependent. On
the other hand, a decrease in the price of assets (bonds and equities) and housing
hold by households and a fall in income reduces the value of households￿collaterals
for loans.
186.)Second-round e⁄ects: If spending of households or ￿rms falls as a
consequence of monetary policy action, other ￿rms revenue also falls, leading to
a decrease in net wealth as a function of rigidities on the cost side.
Therefore, decreasing (increasing) net wealth by lowering both equity and
housing prices and cash-￿ ows (income e⁄ect) results in a decreased (improved)
capacity of obtaining loans because of the aforementioned imperfections of ￿-
nancial markets (adverse selection and moral hazard), which provoke a decrease
(increase) in investment and consumption spendings.
It is worth mentioning that the broad lending channel conveys not only the
e⁄ects of monetary policy because not only changes in monetary conditions but
also alterations of other exogenous factors may lead to changes in the balance
sheet of both household.
4.3 Trade Credit and the Bank Lending Channel
Trade credit, which is usually created if a ￿rm delays payment to its supplier,
is thought to be more expensive than bank credit. However, this holds true
only during ￿normal￿times. Because the terms of trade credit are fairly stable
over time, it may become cheaper relative to bank credit in the wake of a
monetary policy tightening. In fact, trade credit may become the only external
source of ￿nancing for ￿rms with no credit rating and thus access to capital
markets during credit rationing. As a results, if ￿rms also have access to trade
credit, instead of only bank and market ￿nancing, ￿rms hit by external ￿nancing
constraint after a monetary tightening can potentially avoid the squeeze by
increasing trade credit (see e.g. Mateut, 2004).
4.4 The Bank Capital Channel18
A number of recent papers put strong emphasis on the prominent role bank eq-
uity capital plays in the monetary transmission mechanism - also called the bank
capital channel - through which monetary policy in￿ uences credit supply. The
standard credit channel literature has been criticised because it assumes that the
central bank a⁄ects loan supply by altering the required reserves. Chmielewski
(2005) stresses that reserve requirements may be inappropriate as, for instance,
using the interest rate as the main policy instrument, in￿ ation targeting central
banks may not be able to control required reserves. Yet loan supply can be
strongly a⁄ected via changes in bank capital requirements. This channel has
been formalised, for instance, by Van den Heuvel (2002). For the bank capital
channel to be operational, the following assumptions need to apply:
a.) it is costly for banks to raise equity.
b.) banks assume an interest rate risk with the maturity of their credit being
higher than that of their deposits.
c.) capital regulations in￿ uence banks￿credit supply.
18Although the literature typically views the bank capital channel as a separate
channel from the credit channel, because its implications are very close to the credit
channel, we put it in the same basket for the sake of convenience.
19The mechanism works as follows. A rise in interest rates, triggered by mon-
etary policy action, increases the cost of ￿nancing (deposits), while leaving the
remuneration of banks￿assets unchanged due to the maturity mismatch. This
induces a fall in bank capital. In the event that the bank is close to the mini-
mum capital requirement prescribed by law, it is obliged to decrease the supply
of loans as raising equity is costly.
According to van den Heuvel (2002), banks with low capital react slowly but
then in an ampli￿ed fashion to monetary policy shocks. Even banks with high
capital can adjust their loan portfolio if they expect trouble in meeting capital
requirement in the future or, as emphasised by Chmielewski (2005), they intend
to maintain the same level of riskiness of their loan portfolio.
In a banking system where banks possess a considerable amount of corporate
equity like in Germany, any change to the price of corporate equity will have an
direct impact on banks￿pro￿t, capital and consequently on their credit supply
(Markovic, 2004).
Markovic (2004) distinguishes three sub-channels of the bank capital channel:
a. the default risk channel is related to the eventuality that the bank defaults
on its equity, which, in turn, depends on the default risk of ￿rms.
b. the adjustment cost channel re￿ ects asymmetric information between the
bank and its shareholders and the fact that the elimination of it is costly.
c. the capital loss channel
Markovic (2004) argues that the capital cost channel is likely to gain impor-
tance in the occurrence of large shocks to the bank capital, such as writing-o⁄
of non-performing loans or changes in the regulatory framework.
4.5 Trojan Horses A⁄ecting the Credit Channel
There are a number of potential sources which could counteract the transmission
mechanism of the bank lending channel in its ￿rst and second stages and the
internal-external ￿nancing constraint crucial for the broad lending channel.
4.5.1 Factors Interfering with the First Stage of the Bank Lending
Channel
a.) Multi-bank holding networks are conducive for the creation of internal cap-
ital markets, from which a¢ liated banks can bene￿t even though external re-
sources of ￿nancing have dried up. This is especially important for small banks
as, contrary to the basic assumption of the Bernanke and Blinder model, they
can insulate their loan supply from monetary policy shocks (Ashkraft, 2005).
This implies that a smaller number of banks are subject to imperfect substi-
tutability on the asset side. In extreme cases where all banks belong to banking
networks, such as is the case in Germany or in Finland, the bank lending chan-
nel is completely disabled (Ehrmann and Worms, 2001). Gambacorta (2005)
also sheds light on network e⁄ects for Italian banks. In the event that banks
have foreign owners, they belong to a larger network, and the same argument
applies as before.
20b.) An overall well-capitalised banking system may be less conducive for the
bank capital channel.
c.) A high degree of concentration of the banking sector implies the absence
of small banks. As large banks have easier access to alternative external ￿nanc-
ing, they can bu⁄er their credit supply from monetary policy shocks (Adams
and Amel, 2005).
An important point has to be made here. There is a crucial interaction
between the credit channel and the interest rate pass-through. It appears that
more concentrated markets are less vulnerable to the credit channel. At the
same time, banks on these markets do not tend to react proportionately to
interest rate changes. So, they cushion the e⁄ect of monetary policy not only for
quantities but also for prices, and this weakens the overall impact of monetary
policy on the real economy.
d.) The maturity structure of loans and the trade-o⁄ between ￿xed or vari-
able interest rates can very much determine the reaction of loan supply to mone-
tary policy actions. The shorter the maturity structure, the more immediate the
pass-through from monetary policy to loan supply is supposed to be (Ehrmann
et al. 2001).
e.) Relationship lending, i.e. the phenomenon of the Hausbank, may lead
to loan commitments, which could help disconnect to some extent loan supply
from monetary policy (Ehrmann et al. 2001).
f.) The government￿ s involvement in the banking sector either as owner or
via public guarantees can partially o⁄set the e⁄ects of monetary policy on loan
supply (Ehrmann et al. 2001).
g.) If loans to the private sector are denominated in foreign currency, then
domestic interest movements have only a limited e⁄ect on the supply of and
demand for loans since their price is given by the foreign interest rate plus
the exchange rate premium19. A contracting monetary policy manifesting in
higher interest rates would have an opposite e⁄ect than desired as it would
cause an appreciation of the exchange rate, which, in turn, leads to a shrunk
of the FX denominated loan in domestic currency terms. The higher the share
FX denominated loans in total lending, the lower the direct impact of domestic
monetary policy on domestic lending and borrowing activity.
4.5.2 Factors Interfering with the Second Stage of the Bank Lending
Channel
In addition to trade credit and other sorts of inter-company loans, there exists
a number of other factors which may potentially break down the second stage
of the bank lending channel:
a.) A potential attenuation of both the bank lending and the broad lend-
ing channel can occur if ￿rms are able to insulate themselves from short-term
shocks in bank or external borrowing via altering capacity utilisation, if ￿nancial
constraints are anticipated in advance (Wang, 2001).
19Plus default risk, but this is also contained in the domestic interest rate
21b.) Government involvement may also mean soft budget constraint for ￿rms
(Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003). This issue may be especially important
for transition economies, where the hardening of the budget constraint may
vary in function of how advanced the process of privatisation of both the non-
￿nancial corporate and the banking sectors, the introduction of bankruptcy laws,
accounting standards and Western corporate governance are. In particular, soft
budget may be due to open subsidies or implicit subsidies (tolerance of tax
arrears, tax relief and tax concessions) from the government or easy access to
new credits from state-owned banks. A soft budget constraint is still present
at least in some sectors of less advanced transition countries such as Bulgaria,
Croatia and Romania, let alone the CIS countries (see Croitoru and Scha⁄er
(2002) for Romania). However, one may also argue that a soft budget constraint
mostly concern larger ￿rms, which would be otherwise less subject to the credit
channel.
c.) If small ￿rms￿contribution to output is low, or even better, if only a small
fraction of (small) ￿rms relies on bank lending, the macroeconomic impact of
the bank lending channel will be negligible20.
d.) If the distribution of small ￿rms di⁄ers across sectors, the impact of
monetary policy acting via the credit channel may be heterogeneous across
sectors. In particular, it is observed that the share of small ￿rms in output is
considerably larger in the non-tradable than in the tradable sector (Tornell and
Westernmann, 2002). Hence, the credit channel may be more important for the
non-tradable sector21.
4.6 Empirical Evidence for Industrialised Countries
A large number of papers has investigated the relevance of the credit channel
for the US and, more, recently also for Europe. The main preoccupation of this
literature has been to distinguish between the traditional interest channel and
the credit channel, in particular the bank lending channel.
4.6.1 Macroeconomic Studies
Focusing on Spread Data One prediction of the Bernanke and Blinder
model is a non-zero spread between interest rates on credit and bonds. In par-
ticular, if there exists a bank lending channel, a restrictive monetary policy will
lead to an increase in this spread, while monetary expansion causes the spread to
decrease22. This implication is widely exploited in empirical investigations. For
20The capitalisation and the liquidity position of the ￿rms are also important for the
functionining of the credit channel. Altough large ￿rms may be also badly capitalised
and less liquid, small ￿rms usually are less capitalised and less liquid as compared to
large ￿rms.
21It is interesting to note that the vast majority of empirical studies concentrate on
the open sector, i.e. manufacturing. Hence, they may miss the point.
22It should be noted that the credit ￿ treasury bill interest spread seems a good
indicator in tracking down ampli￿cation and attenuation regimes such as set out in
Kierzenkowski (2005a,b).
22instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1994)
document the ampli￿cation of the spread, constructed using short-term rates,
by changes in the stance of monetary policy using data for the 1970s and 1980s.
However, as noted in Bernanke and Gertler (1995), it is di¢ cult, in practice, to
separate the bank lending and the broad lending channels on the basis of the
spread given that the broad lending channel would also predict an ampli￿ca-
tion of the spread, which, in this context, would re￿ ect the di⁄erence between
the costs of external to internal ￿nancing. In contrast, Miron, Romer and Weil
(1994) cannot con￿rm this ampli￿cation for secular US data going back to 1896.
Kierzenkowski (2004) argues that the absence of ampli￿cation is due to the fact
that banks aim to smooth the e⁄ects of changes in the policy rate on the lending
rates. This point leads us back to the issue of interest rate pass-through.
VAR-based Studies Another way of studying the importance of the credit
channel is to use impulse response functions obtained from VAR models. Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) use a VAR-based approach to analyse the reaction of bank
loans, deposits and bonds to a monetary policy tightening. for the US.They
demonstrate that bank deposits decline immediately in the aftermath of a mon-
etary policy shock, whereas loans start to decrease only with a delay of 6 to
9 months. Two years after the monetary shock, bonds appear to recover com-
pletely, while deposits and loans stabilise at a lower level.
The reason why bank lending reacts with such a lag to changes in the stance
of monetary policy is that banks can commit themselves to maintain a given
credit line for a given period for their clients (loan commitments), which is
left unchanged until expiry. Morgan (1998) demonstrates by means of impulse
response functions that ￿committed￿loans are not much in￿ uenced by monetary
policy actions.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) make a step further by decomposing loans into
commercial & industrial (C&I) loans, housing credit and short-term credit.
>From their results it seems that housing and short-term credit contrast and
C&I loans are una⁄ected in the wake of a monetary tightening.
Money or Credit Aggregates as Leading Indicator of Economic Activ-
ity? Another line of research, initiated by King (1986), aimed at separating
the interest rate and credit channels in order to determine if monetary or credit
aggregate is a better indicator of future output. The unanimous verdict of King
(1986), Romer and Romer (1990) and Ramey (1993) is that monetary aggre-
gates better predict future economic activity than credit aggregates, which is a
strong piece of evidence against the bank lending channel.
Identi￿cation Issues There are two major caveats regarding the use of ag-
gregate macroeconomic series worth mentioning at this point. First, it is di¢ cult
to distinguish between the e⁄ects of the traditional interest rate channel and
the credit channel because money and credit aggregates are strongly correlated,
given the construction of bank balance sheets. One solution to circumvent this
23problem using data disaggregated at the sectoral level. Escriva and Haldale
(1994) and Dale and Haldale (1995) argue that this correlation breaks down
at the sectoral level as banks can reallocate credit across sectors. Using data
for British and Spanish households and the non-￿nancial corporate sector, they
shed light on the fact that after a hike in the monetary policy rate, loans to
households decline ￿rst, followed by a drop in output (retail sales for households
and industrial production for ￿rms), and, at a later stage, by a decline in loans
to the corporate sector. By contrast, a fall in money aggregates happens before
the contraction of industrial production. The implication of these ￿ndings is
that the credit channel is at work for households but not for ￿rms for which the
interest rate channel is crucial in the transmission of the e⁄ects of monetary pol-
icy. Kakes (1998) extends this analysis to Dutch data by introducing short- and
long-term credits. It transpires that only long-term loans to households record
a decrease after a monetary tightening. The credit channel does not appear,
however, to be decisive because household consumption does not alter23.
Ramey (1993) proposes an alternative method disentangling the money and
credit channels. Her method consists in ￿rst estimating a comprehensive VAR
including both credit and monetary aggregates. Subsequently, the interest rate
channel is switched o⁄ by restricting the coe¢ cient on a monetary policy shock
in the equation for monetary aggregates to zero. The application of this method
to US data indicates the lack of any response of output to monetary policy shocks
when the interest rate channel is cancelled.
The second major identi￿cation issue relates to the question of whether
changes in the loan series occur as a result of a variation of the loan supply or
because monetary policy a⁄ects output through the interest channel, which, in
turn, is re￿ ected in an alteration of credit demand. Driscoll (2004) considers the
US as an ensemble of small open economies with a ￿xed exchange rate regime.
The implication is that the interest channel is deactivated as the FED only
responds to country-level shocks as opposed to state-speci￿c shocks, so state-
speci￿c money demand shocks results in state-speci￿c shock in loan supply if
there is bank lending channel. He shows that the bank lending channel breaks
down at its second stage as loan supply is a⁄ected by money demand (the ￿rst
stage of the bank lending channel) but loan supply has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on
output (the second stage of the bank lending channel). That is, ￿rms are not
bank dependent.
The ￿Mix￿ Variable The second identi￿cation issue can also be addressed
by the use of the ￿mix￿variable. The so-called ￿mix￿variable is designed as
an attempt to overcome the identi￿cation problem encountered when using ag-
gregate macroeconomic series. Using the ￿mix￿variable capturing changes in
bank lending relative to total external ￿nancing (bank lending + commercial
papers), Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) demonstrated that the ￿mix￿vari-
able decreased during periods of US monetary tightening, implying the decline
23Results also show that banks orchestrate a shift in loans from households to ￿rms,
which can be viewed as a ￿ ight to quality.
24in bank lending relative to other external resources and thus lending support
to the bank lending channel. However, we cannot take this result at face value.
As the amount of commercial papers is quasi zero for small ￿rms, a drop in
the ￿mix￿would be in line with both the bank lending and the broad lending
channel. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) split US manufacturing ￿rms into small
and large ￿rms and broadened the de￿nition of non-bank external lending by
adding loans from ￿nance and insurance companies (a signi￿cant amount both
for small and large ￿rms). Their result indicates that the ￿mix￿is una⁄ected for
the two groups of ￿rms and that all types of ￿nancing shift from small to large
￿rms. This indeed supports the broad lending channel view instead. Kashyap,
Stein and Wilcox (1996) responded by disaggregating their original mix vari-
able along the lines of small and large ￿rms, and found a signi￿cant - although
somewhat less so than for aggregated data - decrease in the mix variable for
large ￿rms.
Combining the VAR methodology with the ￿mix￿variable, Ludvigson (1998)
presents econometric evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel for
US automobile credit. Although an unanticipated monetary policy shock sig-
ni￿cantly changes the mix variable, and a change in the mix variable causes a
variation in automobile consumption, he concludes that its quantitative e⁄ect
on overall car sales is negligible.
4.6.2 Studies Using Large Bank and Firm Level Panel Datasets
The First Stage ￿Bank￿ s Balance Sheet Micro-based bank and ￿rm level
panel data help to give more insight into the bank lending channel. Credit supply
and credit demand can be separated from each other when focusing on balance
sheet characteristics of banks or ￿rms. Features of individual banks determine
their capacity to supply credit, but these features are not connected to credit
demand. Along the same lines, systematic di⁄erences in ￿rms￿characteristics
may explain their diverging ability to absorb credit, without this being related
to credit supply. This accounts for the recent surge of papers, which focus on the
use of large bank and ￿rm-level panels. One of the ￿rst and most cited papers is
that of Kashyap and Stein (1995). They split banks into subgroups dependent
on their size, measured in terms of total assets. They conjecture that the bank
lending channel implies that small banks have limited access to market ￿nance,
and, for this reason, both loans and bonds will contract in their portfolios after
a monetary policy shock. However, it turns out that only small banks￿loans and
not bonds decrease. They explain this by the fact that small banks accord loans
over-proportionately to small ￿rms, whose credit demand is procyclical. Hence,
negative monetary policy shocks may change the business climate negatively
through channels other than the credit channel, which yields a lower demand for
credit from small businesses. Kashyap and Stein (2000) introduce, additionally,
the liquidity position of banks by estimating the following equation for groups
of banks of di⁄erent size:24
24Kashyap and Stein (2000) also presented estimation results for a two-stage setup.


















where ￿Lit is the growth rate in loan supply for bank i for period t, M
measures monetary policy, Y is real output and C denotes bank characteristics
(e.g. the liquidity of banks)25. The interaction between monetary policy and
banks￿characteristics are captured by
4 P
j=1
￿j. They ￿nd that small and less
liquid banks are most responsive to monetary policy actions, which, they argue,
is in line with the bank lending channel.
In a similar setup, Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan (2004) shed some light on
the role of uncertainty of ￿nancial markets on bank lending behaviour. Using a
variety of alternative measures for uncertainty, they show that increased uncer-
tainty leads to higher credit supply, and this is independent of the bank size. At
the same time, increased uncertainty with a low liquidity position results in a
decline in loan supply albeit to a lesser extent than for banks with high liquid-
ity, implying greater risk-taking by low-liquidity banks. An important ￿nding
is that the group of small banks, as de￿ned in Kashyap and Stein (2000), is a
heterogeneous group with respect to reactions to monetary policy actions, and
this clearly downplays the importance of the bank lending channel in the US
economy.
An increasing number of papers have provided ￿rm empirical backing for the
bank capital channel. Peek and Rosengren (1995), Thakor (1996), and Hancock
and Wilcox (1998) demonstrated the importance of the introduction of new risk-
based capital requirements, i.e. he Basle agreement on capital requirements in
1989 and 1992, during the 1990-92 credit crunch in the US economy. Using
micro-level panel of banks, Kishan and Opiela (2000), for the US demonstrate
that small banks with low-capital are most a⁄ected by contractionary monetary
policy in their lending behaviour, be it commercial & industrial, housing or
household loans. Markovic (2004b) reaches similar conclusion for the UK.
As far as the euro area is concerned, Favero, Gavazzi and Flabbi (1999)
provided some evidence against the bank lending channel in 1992, on the basis
of large bank-level datasets for the four largest euro area countries, namely
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. By estimating equation (8) for a cross-section
of banks, it turns out that changes in reserves do not have any signi￿cant e⁄ect








25Equation (7) can also contain dummies capturing time e⁄ects, quarter e⁄ect and
di⁄erences across US states.
26where DECILE refers to the size of banks (by decile of the distribution on
total assets), reserves denote changes in bank reserves and captures e⁄ects of
monetary policy, while C the liquidity position of the banks.
The ECB has recently coordinated a huge research e⁄ort in order to obtain a
general and comparable picture on the functioning of the credit channel in euro
area countries. Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Mart￿nez-PagØs, Sevestre and Worms
(2001) study the ￿rst stage of the bank lending channel for the four largest
euro area economies (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) using the Kashyap

























Where C is bank characteristic such as liquidity, size and capitalisation.
They demonstrate that only the liquidity position of the individual banks mat-
ters for loan growth in response to a monetary policy tightening/easing, whereas
the size and capitalisation of banks appear to be of no relevance26. They also
summarise the key ￿ndings of related research for smaller euro area economies.
The liquidity position seems to be a major factor in transmitting the impact of
monetary policy on credit supply, with the exception of Finland and Portugal.
However, size also matters in Greece and the Netherlands and the bank capital
channel is found to be operational in the Netherlands and Portugal.
Ehrmann et al. (2001) speculate regarding the unimportant role for capi-
talisation. Either the fact of using a simple and not risk-adjusted measure of
capitalisation may be not an appropriate proxy or the high level of bank capi-
talisation does not leave too much room for the operation of the bank capital
channel. Nevertheless, recent research casts some doubt on an overwhelming
￿liquidity channel￿ . Altunbas, Fazylov and Molyneux (2002), using BankScope
data and Pizarro-Barcel￿ (2004), employing data obtained from Spanish sources
support the existence of a bank capital channel in the euro area and in Spain,
respectively. Pizarro-Barcel￿ (2004) ￿nds size to be an important factor for the
credit channel. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2003) rede￿nes capitalisation as the
excess capital and uncover that banks with excess capital react less to monetary
policy shocks in Italy
The Second Stage ￿Firm￿ s Balance Sheet The second stage of the credit
channel ￿the ￿rms balance sheet ￿has obtained less attention than the ￿rst
26They stress that the use of bank-level data obtained from BankScope is biased
towards large banks as small banks are underrepresented. Therefore, they suggest the
use of data collected at the national levels o⁄ering a broader coverage of the respective
banking systems.
27stage as it is usually assumed that a considerable proportion of ￿rms are bank-
dependent. Hence, once it is established that monetary policy is capable of
impacting on credit supply, it is taken for granted that this e⁄ect will feed into
the non-￿nancial corporate sector.
Notwithstanding this observation, there are papers aimed at formally test-
ing the validity of the second stage of the credit channel. For instance, Yalcin,
Bougheas and Mizen (2004) rede￿ne the ￿mix￿variable as a measure of indebt-
edness of ￿rms27 and investigate, for a panel of 16000 UK ￿rms, how, after a
change in monetary policy, the ￿mix￿variable changes for ￿rms28. In particular,
they ￿nd that the debt ratio tend to be more sensitive to changes in monetary
policy for small, risky, highly indebted, and young ￿rms as opposed to large,
secure, low-geared and well-established ￿rms.
Also using large micro panels, Chatelain et al. (2001) ￿nd that manufactur-
ing ￿rms￿investments are strongly dependent on sales and cash-￿ ow. However,
only Italian, and not German, French and Spanish ￿rms respond di⁄erently to
changes in sales and cash-￿ ow in their investment demand as a function of their
size.
4.6.3 Studies Based on Credit Card Data
Gross and Souleles (2000) propose di⁄erentiating between loan supply and de-
mand using individual-level credit card data.. Data on credit limits and credit
balances provides an excellent opportunity for analysing separately credit sup-
ply and credit demand. Although Gross and Souleles (2000) only look at how
changes in credit limits a⁄ect debt accumulation and how sensitive credit bal-
ances to changes in account-speci￿c interest rates are, it remains a promising
avenue for future research to investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks
on the supply of and demand for this type of consumer credit.
4.6.4 Empirical Evidence on Trade Credit
A number of empirical studies has recently shown the importance of trade credit
in external ￿nancing, especially during times of monetary tightening. Trade
credit amounts to up to a quarter of ￿rms￿liabilities in the US, Germany, France
and Italy (Mateut, Bougheas and Mizen, 2002) and is considerably higher in the
UK (Kohler, Britton and Yates, 2000). Mateut (2004) lists a number of papers
underpinning the importance of trade credit.
Nilsen (2002) ￿nds for a sample of US ￿rms that small ￿rms have more
recourse on trade credit after a hardening of the monetary stance. Although
27They use three alternative de￿nitions: a.) total short-term debt to total liabilities,
b.) total debt to total liabilities and c.) short-term debt to total debt.
28The ￿mix￿variable is regressed on monetary policy conditions (MPC), a dummy
capturing tight and loose monetary policy for 1990-92 and 1993-1999 (MPP), respec-
tively, and the separate and joint interaction of MPC and MPP with ￿rm character-
istics (small vs. large; risky vs. secure; young vs. old; highly vs. lowly indebted; high
pro￿table vs. low pro￿table) and a number of control variables including total real
assets (for size), credit rating, age, the solvency ratio and the gearing ratio.
28this is in line with the bank lending channel, it also implies that a decline in
bank borrowing is compensated by a rise in trade credit. In addition, Nilsen
(2002) also shows that large ￿rms without bond rating increase trade credit.
Hence, more ￿rms may feel the pain of ￿nancial constraints than thought in the
previous literature.Mateut, Boughas and Mizen (2003) report similar results for
manufacturing ￿rms in the UK.
4.6.5 Summary
A number of conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the above discussion, sum-
marised in Table 2. The macro evidence seems to be fairly weak regarding the
bank lending channel. However, loans to households may be more responsive to
monetary policy shocks than corporate loans. Even so, it remains controversial
the extent to which those changes matter for household consumption. The use
of micro bank and ￿rm level data suggests that bank lending activity may be
a⁄ected by monetary policy. However, there is no consensus on which charac-
teristics of banks (size, liquidity, capitalisation) matter most. The second stage
of the bank lending channel appears to be more debated as some authors point
out the existence of a broad lending channel instead of a bank lending channel.
In addition, trade credit seems to be an important source of external ￿nancing
for ￿rms with no credit rating.
29Table 2. Summary of the Credit Channel in Developed Countries






Bernanke-Gertler(1995) US, spread YES
Kashyap et al. (1994) US, spread YES
Miron et al (1994) US, spread NO
Bernanke-Blinder (1992) US, VAR YES
Morgan (1998) US, VAR NO
Gertler-Bernanke (1993) US, VAR NO/YES
King (1986) US NO
Romer-Romer (1990) US NO
Ramey (1993) US NO
Escriva-Haldale (1994) Spain HH
Dale-Haldale (1995) UK HH
Kakes (1998) Netherlands HH?
Kashyap et al. (￿ 93,￿ 96) US YES





Kashyap-Stein (￿ 95,￿ 00) US YES
Baum et al. (2004) US YES
Favero et al. (1999) Europe NO
Ehrmann et al. (2001) Europe YES
Altunbas et al (2002) Europe BK




Yalcin et al. (2004) UK YES YES
Chatelain et al. (2001) Europe YES YES
Kohler et al (2000) UK YES
Nilsen (2002) US YES





Notes: BK denotes the existence of the bank capital channel. HH=loans to households,
? = questionable or weak evidence
4.7 Empirical Evidence for the CEECs
4.7.1 Evidence from VAR-based Studies
The body of empirical literature focusing on Central and Eastern Europe is
quite a specialised literature, in the sense that most studies concentrate on the
￿rst stage of the bank lending channel and only a few make use of the VAR-
based approach. Hence, a number of possibilities still await for exploitation.
30Let us ￿rst consider the small amount of evidence that generated has from VAR
models. Wr￿bel (2001) shows for Poland that a shock to short-term interest rates
causes real credits to drop in the short run and to be stabilising at the lower level
afterwards. Creel and Levasseur (2005) ￿nd that after the initial decrease, credit
recovers for Poland. For the Czech Republic and Hungary, the results indicate
a short-term rise, rather than a fall in the credit series after a monetary policy
shock. Finally, HØricourt (2005) studies the impact of a credit shock on output
and prices. The general outcome is that a credit shock temporarily increases
both output and prices (for Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). For the Czech
Republic, output ￿rst falls and then recovers. For Estonia, the results for prices
depend on whether GDP or industrial production is used. However, special care
should be taken with these results because in some cases, the impulse-response
functions (IRF) look unusual, i.e. exhibiting a cyclical ￿ uctuation around zero,
which is di¢ cult to explain. The second cautionary note, applying to all three
studies is that the vast majority of IRFs are not very signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero when taking account of the con￿dence intervals.
4.7.2 Evidence from Micro Bank-Level Data
Turning to the micro-data based evidence, this strand of the literature uses a
variant of equation (9) employed in Ehrmann et al. (2001), which, in turn, is
an improvement of Kashyap and Stein (2000). Note that equation (9) is usually
estimated separately for di⁄erent bank characteristics ( C). That is, a separate
regression is run, for instance, for size, liquidity, capitalisation and ownership
structure. HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di, (2005) extend this list with the average
cost of funds. Note, however, that a number of authors also include include
simultaneously all bank-speci￿c characteristics (e.g. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk,
2005; K￿hler, Hommel and Grote, 2005; Schmitz, 2004) or only two at the same
time (HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di, 2005).
Overall, the empirical results strongly support the view that banks react
di⁄erently to monetary policy changes depending on the above listed character-
istics. However, the bank-level characteristics are not equally important. For
instance, Juks (2004) ￿nds that the supply of household and corporate loans
turn out to be most a⁄ected for banks with a low level of liquidity, while bank
size and capitalisation does not matter. K￿hler, Hommel and Grote (2005) and
Matousek and Sarantis (2006) come to a similar conclusion merging data on
aggregate loans for the three Baltic countries although Matousek and Sarantis
(2006) also ￿nd size as an important factor. Bank capitalisation may not mat-
ter for two reasons. First, capitalisation measured at the bank-level may not be
an appropriate measure. Instead, the capitalisation of the whole bank holding
should be considered. Second, as also noted by Ehrmann et al. (2001), bank
capitalisation is high enough not to be a⁄ected by changes in monetary condi-
tions. A ￿nal ￿nding is that none of the three characteristics (size, liquidity and
capitalisation) are correlated with corporate loan supply in a robust manner.
In a similar vein, Schmitz (2004) shows for a set of CEECs that size and the
liquidity position seems to matter and that the reaction of foreign-owned banks
31is more pronounced to a change in domestic and foreign monetary conditions
than their domestic counterparts. However, pooling all countries may mask
considerable cross-country heterogeneities as country-speci￿c studies suggest.
An excellent example is Matousek and Sarantis (2006) who cover all CEE-5 plus
the three Baltic countries to show substantial country di⁄erences. In addition to
the heterogeneity prevailing across countries, sometimes the results are rather
variable even for the very same country. Poland is a case in point. Havrylchyk
and Jurzyk (2005) ￿nd that better liquidity position enables banks to insulate
loans from monetary policy actions. Weak evidence is also found for the size of
the banks. However, the estimated coe¢ cient indicates that smaller banks are
in a better position to shield themselves from monetary policy. Finally, bank
capitalisation turns out to play no role in the lending behaviour of banks. This
stands in strong contrast with Wr￿bel and Pawlowska (2002) who ￿nd that size
and capitalisation explain in a standard manner (larger and more capitalised
banks react less) bank lending behaviour in the face of a monetary policy move,
while more liquid banks are more responsive to an increase in the policy rate
than less liquid banks. This counterintuitive ￿nding can be explained, according
to the authors, by the overliquidity of the Polish banking sector. The most
robust variable in the regressions run by Chmielewski (2005) and by Matousek
and Sarantis (2006) is capitalisation, which indicates that better capitalised
banks are shielded from the e⁄ects of monetary policy. Foreign involvement
generally turns out to result in more responsiveness to monetary policy. The
results for liquidity are in conformity with the ￿ndings in Wr￿bel and Pawlowska
(2002). Finally, it deserves mentioning that the e⁄ect of bad loans may have
opposite signs across di⁄erent speci￿cations, and, importantly, FX-denominated
loans, especially those to households, are very much insensitive to monetary
policy actions.
For the Czech Republic, while Matousek and Sarintis (2006) ￿nd that size,
capitalisation and liquidity are important from 1994 to 2003, Pruteanu (2004)
comes to the conlusion that better capitalised and more liquid banks appear
to be less responsive to monetary policy from 1996 to 1998 but not from 1999
to 2001. In contrast, the result that larger banks and banks with more bad
loans in their portfolio care less about monetary policy can lead back to the
existence of a soft budget constraint mainly because of the unaccomplished
privatisation of the banking sector. In addition, it seems that size is especially
important for foreign banks for which the coe¢ cient switches sign between the
two sub-periods. From 1996 to 1998, larger foreign banks were more a⁄ected
by monetary policy actions, while from 1999 to 2001, smaller foreign banks
exhibited more responsiveness. Liquidity matters for foreign banks in the ￿rst
sub-period, whilst it becomes important for Czech banks and foreign branches
in the second subperiod.
For Hungary, HorvÆth, Krek￿ and Nasz￿di (2005) show that using more dis-
aggregated loan series makes it is easier to pin down the bank lending channel
and that all bank characteristics have a play to role although their results also
reveal that some of the bank characteristics are not particularly robust. This
is in contrast with Matousek and Sarintis (2006), who can identify size as the
32only variable explaning diverging bank lending activity as a result of mone-
tary policy changes. Furthermore, the results reported in HorvÆth, Krek￿ and
Nasz￿di (2005) indicate that FX denominated corporate loans are very much
inresponsive to monetary policy actions.
Finally, according to Golodniuk (2005), Ukrainian banks react di⁄erently to
changes only as a function of capitalisation but not as a function of size and
liquidity.
33Table 3 Results of the Empirical Literature on CEE
Author Country Type of assets Size Liq Cap Bad Own
Schmitz (2004) CEE-5 + B3 Total loans Yes Yes ￿ Yes
Pruteanu (2004) Czech Rep. Total loans Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Czech Rep. Total loans Yes Yes Yes ￿ ￿
K￿hler et al. (2005) B3, pooled Total loans Yes ￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
























Hungary Total loans Yes ￿ ￿
Chmielewski (2005) Poland
HH loans ￿ DC
HH loans ￿ FX
COR loans ￿ DC























Poland Total loans Yes ￿ ￿
Wr￿bel and
Pawloska (2002)
Poland Total loans Yes Yes ￿ ￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)
Slovakia Total loans ? ? ? ￿ ￿
Matousek and
Sarantis (2006)










Note: ? indicates weak evidence in favor of the given variable. HH and COR stand
for households and the non￿nancial corporate sector. DC stands for loans denominated
in domestic currency, FX for those in foreign currency. CEE-5 stands for the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; B3 stands for the three Baltic countries.
￿ indicates that the given variable is not included in the study
Liq, Cap, Bad and Own are liquidity, capitalization bad loans and ownership
4.8 Some Criticism
A number of critical remarks can be addressed vis-￿-vis the literature aimed at
studying the credit channel in Central and Eastern Europe. The literature is
still very scarce and deals only with selected aspects of the credit channel. No
attempt has so far been made to investigate systematically how interest rates
34a⁄ect credit aggregates and how changes in credit aggregates in￿ uence output
and prices. This is in particular true for micro- based panel studies, which have
yet to analyse the second stage of the bank lending channel. As we know, even
though bank lending behaviour is in￿ uenced by monetary policy steps, for the
bank lending channel to be operational, it needs to be veri￿ed whether ￿rms
are solely relying on bank loans.
Chmielewski (2005) provides a good example in looking at loan series split
into domestic and foreign currency denomination and into corporate and house-
hold loans. Perhaps a little more disaggregation looking at diverse segments of
the corporate and household market (short-term, long-term, consumer, housing
and automobile credit) would provide a better understanding of how, if at all,
the credit channel works in Central and Eastern Europe. A remaining future
challenge is to obtain estimates from bank- and ￿rm-level datasets regarding
the adjustment taking place in output and prices in the aftermath of a change
in monetary policy.
But perhaps the most important shortcoming of the literature, relating to
the credit channel in general, is to assume that credit markets are in equilibrium
and that the credit series used for estimation purposes re￿ ects this equilibrium.
However, disequilibrium at the credit market may have important implications
for monetary policy. If there is excess demand for credit, banks tend to ration,
and for this reason, may amplify (attenuate) the e⁄ect of a monetary policy
tightening (loosening). In contrast, if the supply of credit exceeds the demand
for credit, perhaps because banks hold too much liquidity, banks will not pass
through changes in the policy rate on their retail rates in the event of a monetary
policy tightening29, because this would reduce the demand for credit, already
insu¢ cient to clear the market. Nonetheless, an interest rate cut would be very
quickly incorporated into loan rates (Hurlin and Kierzenkowski, 2002, 2003).
Hurlin and Kierzekowski (2003) identify excess supply of credit until mid-1999
and a regime of excess demand for credit in Poland and argue that the existence
of these two regimes may explain why Polish monetary policy became much more
e¢ cient after 1999.
5 Exchange Rate Channel
Beside interest rates and asset prices, both nominal and real exchange rates play
a prominent role in the monetary transmission mechanism. Monetary policy is
able to bring about changes in the level of the exchange rate and thus to provoke
changes in (a) prices, (b) trade volumes and (c) investment. The ￿rst stage of
the transmission mechanism is how short-term interest rates impact on exchange
rates. The second stage is then the pass-through from exchange rates to import
and domestic prices, followed by an adjustment in real variables such as imports,
exports and investment.
29This is the connection how the state of the credit market in￿ uences the interest
rate pass-through.
355.1 Monetary Policy Actions and the Exchange Rate
Central to all open economy macro models is a variant of the real interest rate
parity (RIP) condition, which links the expected change in the real exchange rate
to a real interest di⁄erential30. Although the extant evidence on this relationship
is rather mixed this, as Baxter (1994) initially noted, it is more a re￿ ection of
the application of inappropriate econometric methods (in particular mixing I(1)
and I(0) variables) than any inherent de￿ciency in the relationship itself (see
also Ho⁄man and MacDonald, 2005). MacDonald and Nagayasu (1999) have
demonstrated strong support for the RIP condition in a panel setting and Chinn
and Meredith (2005) have demonstrated support for long horizon interest rate
maturities.
In addition to changes in the short-term interest rate, monetary authorities
may also in￿ uence short-run exchange rate movements by directly intervening
on the foreign exchange markets. Although it is widely acknowledged that
unsterilised interventions a⁄ect the exchange rate by altering relative money
supplies, the empirical evidence is fairly mixed regarding the e⁄ectiveness of
sterilized interventions, which may work through the portfolio, the signaling
and the microstructure (or co-ordination) channels. In their literature survey,
Sarno and Taylor (2001) conclude, however, that what emerges from studies
focusing on the 1990s is that interventions tend to impact on the exchange rates,
￿especially if the intervention is publicly announced and concerted and provided
it is consistent with the underlying stance of monetary and ￿scal policy￿ .
5.2 Exchange Rate and Prices
Generally, nominal exchange rate movements provoked by monetary policy ac-
tion have the potential31 to be translated into domestic in￿ ation on the grounds
of a modi￿cation of imported ￿nal goods prices, and because an alteration in
the price of imported intermediate goods puts, via the price of domestically
manufactured tradable and non-tradable goods, downward or upward pressure
on domestic in￿ ation (FX => import prices => consumer prices and FX =>
import prices =>producer prices => consumer prices).
How the exchange rate a⁄ects domestic prices via imported prices in the end
depends crucially on the pricing behaviour of importing ￿rms. If prices are set
in the importer￿ s prices (producer currency pricing; PCP), any change in the
exchange rate will be automatically transmitted onto prices of the destination
country. This implies complete exchange rate pass-through, which is sometimes
also referred to as Grassman￿ s Law, and the validity of the law of one price since
30This is central to the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model and also to the New Open
Economy Macroeconomics (see Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1996); a risk adjusted variant of
real interest rate parity is also central to the portfolio balance class of model ￿see, for
example, Mussa (1986).
31The word potential has to be underlined here, as a great deal of factors aside from
monetary policy has the ability to cause the exchange rate to change. As a result, the
pass-through of exchange rate to prices is only partly due to monetary policy action.
36the real exchange rate remains stable32.
Alternatively, if the price of imported goods is ￿xed in the local currency
(local or consumer currency pricing; LCP), exchange rate movements are not
re￿ ected in domestic prices and the pass-through is zero. As a consequence, the
real exchange rate may drift away from the level given by the law of one price
and is correlated with the nominal exchange rate33. Importing ￿rms practicing
LCP will alter their mark-up in response to changes in the exchange rate, while
those engaging in PCP usually adjust their output and labour in response to
changes in local prices.
5.2.1 Di⁄ering Pass-Through for Imported, Producer and Consumer
Prices
A typical ￿nding of the empirical literature for imported goods prices is that
the pass-through lies between 0 and 1, which disquali￿es both LCP and PCP
(Campa and Goldberg, 2002)34. According to the consensus of the literature
reported in Goldberg and Knetter (1997), the pass-through from exchange rate
to import prices is of 60% for the US. More recent studies ￿nd even lower
long-run pass-through to import prices (Campa and Goldberg (2002): 29.2%
and Mihailov (2005): 24.4%). Pass-through estimates are typically higher for
other developed countries. For instance, Campa and Goldberg (2002) report
a pass-through of around 40% and 80% for Germany and Japan, respectively,
while Mihailov (2005) ￿nds complete pass-through to import prices for these
two economies.
The incomplete pass-through to import prices may be due to third degree
price discrimination eventually preventing a complete pass-through even for ho-
mogenous imported goods. For price discrimination to apply, it is necessary
that i.) ￿rms are able to separate di⁄erent markets from each other, ii.) ￿rms
are capable of preventing the resale of the products and iii.) they have mar-
ket power (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). Additional factors explaining market
segmentation are: (a) transportation costs, (b) custom duties, (c) non-tari⁄bar-
riers, (d) di⁄erences in characteristics of even relatively homogenous products,
(e) home or brand loyalty, (f) presence of multinationals, and (g) intra-￿rm
trade (Darvas, 2001).
However, even if we assume perfect pass-through for imported goods, the
large body of literature dealing with the exchange rate pass-through usually
pins down the following hierarchy across prices: the pass-through is highest for
imported goods, is lower for producer goods and is lowest for consumer prices.
Although this is not at ￿rst sight surprising, when account is taken for purely
32Another implication is that a change in the relative price of imported and domes-
tic goods will shift consumption from one type of goods to the other type of goods
(expenditure switching).
33This is indeed a well documented fact for industrialised countries (see MacDonald,
2005).
34Choudhry et al. (2005) ￿nd that the theoretical model that best ￿ts the data is
the one that incorporate sticky prices and wages, distribution costs and a combination
of LCP and PCP.
37domestically produced goods and services (without any imported intermediate
input), we may think of this issue in two ways:
1. One strand of the literature emphasises the role of distribution costs for
￿nal imported goods. As imported goods reach consumers through wholesaling
and retailing networks (including transportation, marketing and advertisement),
their prices have a substantial local input, which serves as a bu⁄er to attenuate
exchange rate changes. Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2002, 2004), for
example, show that large devaluations of the home currency are not re￿ ected in
in￿ ation of corresponding size because of the distribution sector, and because
consumers switch from imported goods to local brands of lower quality and,
hence, of lower price (￿ ight from quality). Analogously, large appreciations may
not necessarily yield lower in￿ ation if there is a ￿ ight to quality.
2. Other researchers emphasise the role of intermediate imported goods by
assuming that imported goods are intermediate goods to which PCP applies
(that is, there is full pass-through). The price of the ￿nal goods, which is a
combination of imported intermediate goods and local goods, is set in the local
currency (Engel, 2002)35. The pass-through would be higher than zero but
sluggish in the event that prices in local currency are adjusted periodically (due
to sticky prices) when exchange rate movements could be also incorporated.
5.2.2 Slow-Down of the Pass-Through to Prices Over Time?
Another important ￿nding in the literature is that the exchange rate pass-
through is higher for developing countries and that it declines over time both for
industrialised and for developing countries36. Two explanations are advanced
for this observation in the literature. The ￿rst one relates to the role of macro-
economic variables, especially in￿ ation. The second option considers the shift
in imports from goods with higher pass-through towards goods with lower pass-
through elasticities.
The Role of the Macroeconomic Environment Taylor (2000) conjectured
that the slow-down in the pass-through (and the di⁄erence between developing
and developed countries) is due to changes in the macroeconomic environment,
in particular in the level and variability of in￿ ation rates. This proposition
has been extensively tested in a two-stage approach similar to that used for
the investigation of the determinants of the interest rate pass-through. First,
country-speci￿c exchange rate pass-through coe¢ cients are estimated. Second,
the estimated coe¢ cients are regressed on a number of candidate explanatory
variables. Devereux and Yetman (2003) and Choudhry and Hakura (2001) show
for a sample of 122 and 71 countries, respectively that high in￿ ation is conducive
to perfect pass-through and is often associated with complete pass-through37.
35In this sense, there is expenditure switching for the producer and not for the
consumer.
36Campa and Goldberg (2002) argue that the decline in the exchange rate pass-
through can be observed only for half of the OECD countries.
37This is in accord with the literature on PPP. If PPP holds for the traded goods
sector, i.e. the real exchange rate is stable at a given horizon, the pass-through could
38Ca￿ Zorzi, Hahn and Sanchez (2005) come to similar conclusions using a smaller
set of developing and developed countries. This is because menu costs are out-
weighed by costs related to high in￿ ation. Consequently, ￿rms adjust prices in
every period eliminating price stickiness and thus improving pass-through. De-
vereux and Yetman (2003) also demonstrate that the level of in￿ ation does not
explain pass-through once the sample is split into low and high-in￿ ation coun-
tries. While the above mentioned studies are relying on a two-stage approach
in which country-speci￿c pass-through coe¢ cients are estimated ￿rst and then
regressed on potential explanatory variables, Bailliu and Fujii (2004) use a panel
setting in which changes in in￿ ation rates are controlled for by means of dummy
variables. In contrast to the earlier literature, it turns out that the pass-through
declined for import, producer and consumer prices for a set of 11 OECD coun-
tries during the 1990s. Gagnon and Ihrig (2001), and especially Soto and Selaive
(2003), claim that in￿ ation variability is more important than the level of the
in￿ ation. In addition, Soto and Selaive (2003) also ￿nd openness and country
size to be an important factors in determining the pass-through. The higher the
openness and the smaller a country38, they argue, the higher the pass-through.
The Composition of Trade and Imports Even though Campa and Gold-
berg (2002) con￿rm the importance of in￿ ation, and also that of exchange rate
volatility39, they emphasise that the macroeconomic factors are dominated in
the long run by what they call the ￿ composition e⁄ect￿ . As pass-through is nearly
complete for energy and raw materials and is considerably lower than unity for
food and manufactured products, a shift in the composition of imports from raw
materials towards manufactured goods, the argument goes, induces a decline in
the exchange rate pass-through for imported goods. The econometric tests sup-
port this idea for a sample of OECD countries. This is also the kind of reasoning
that could be applied to explain why the pass-through is higher for developing
countries (importing more high pass-through goods) than in developed countries
(importing more low-pass-through goods)
Evidence Based on Individual Imported Goods Frankel, Parsley and
Wei (2005) study the pass-through to prices of individual goods40 for a large
set of countries. In general, it turns out that pass-through is not complete for
import prices at the dock. Also, the pass-through to import prices in the US
is found to be considerably lower than for other developed economies. Given
be viewed as highly e¢ cient. But empirical observations con￿rm that PPP seems
to hold for very high-in￿ ation countries, but this is apparently not the case of low-
in￿ ation economies. In addition to this, Peel, Sarno and Taylor (2002) put forward
that the pass-through is non-linear, that is nominal exchange rates impact on prices
only if they are large enough.
38They measure openness in three alternative ways: 1.) imports to GDP, 2.) import
duties as a share of imports and 3.) tari⁄ rates on intermediate and capital goods.
39Note that Soto and Selaive (2003) cannot ￿nd evidence, for a larger sample, for
exchange rate volatility as a driving force behind exchange rate pass-through.
40Marlboro cigarettes, Coca-cola, Cognac, Gilbey￿ s gin, Time magazine, Kodak
colour ￿lm, Cointreau liqueur and Martini&Rossi Vermouth.
39the high disaggregation of the data, the composition e⁄ect cannot be at the
root of this phenomenon, which mitigates the Campa and Goldberg argument.
However, it is also unearthed that the pass-through to import prices increased
over time, while it decreased for retail and the CPI level for developing countries
(but not for developed ones). The cross sectional dimension of the date reveals
that the most important factors in￿ uencing the size of the pass-through are a.)
distance (transport costs), b.) GDP per capita, c.) the level of in￿ ation, and to
a lesser extent d.) the size of the economy.
The Role of Expectations Finally, at the heart of the pass-through process
are expectations of the extent of the pass-through and the transitory or per-
manent nature of the change in the exchange rate. While changes perceived
as transitory will not a⁄ect prices, changes which are regarded as permanent
will impact on prices. The role of the exchange rate regime is not, in gen-
eral, dealt with in this literature, although the pass-through is thought to be
higher for countries where the exchange rate serves as a nominal anchor to in-
￿ ationary expectations. In this case any change in the exchange rate will be
rapidly incorporated into expectations and thus into prices (both tradable and
non-tradable). In contrast, if the exchange rate is not used as an intermediary
target, expectations are not that strongly associated with the exchange rate,
resulting in a lower pass-through. A ￿ oating exchange rate regime will little
in￿ uence non-tradable prices.
5.3 The Impact of the Exchange Rate on Trade and In-
vestment
As regards trade ￿ ows, an appreciation (depreciation) of the exchange rate is
thought to penalise (promote) exports and increase imports leading to deterio-
rating (improving) trade balance. However, this holds true only if the Marshall-
Lerner condition is veri￿ed and the sum of the price elasticities of export and
import demand is higher than unity. The functioning of the Marshall-Lerner
condition is also based on full pass-through to import prices (in local currency)
and zero pass-through to export prices (in foreign currency). Hence, the failure
of complete pass-through implies that the Marshall-Lerner condition need not
apply.
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2004) document the fact that the import con-
tent of investment is signi￿cantly higher than the import content of consump-
tion. As a result, the pass-through to investment prices is potentially higher
than that to the price of consumer goods. However, pass-through is also in-
complete because of the non-tradable component of investment. Contrary to
consumer goods, the bulk of the non-tradable component is due to construction
services while the share of distribution services is negligible.
Campa and Goldberg (1995) postulate that the impact of the exchange rate
on sectoral investment depends on the export share and the import content
of production of the sector. More speci￿cally, exchange rate depreciation (ap-
40preciation) expands (decreases) investment if the export share is high. A high
import content of sectoral production works in the opposite direction. Further-
more, high mark-up sectors do not tend to respond to exchange rate movements
in investment demand, whereas low mark-up sectors respond stronger to changes
in the exchange rate.
We can draw a connection here between the exchange rate channel and the
credit channel. The e⁄ect of the credit channel (see below) on the economic ac-
tivity of ￿rms constrained by external ￿nance is exacerbated if these ￿rms are in
low mark-up sectors. The second relation linking the exchange rate channel and
the credit channel is how the foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities
in ￿rms￿balance sheet and thus their net wealth is in￿ uenced by exchange rate
movements. If changes in the exchange rate impact on signi￿cantly on ￿rms￿
balance sheet, it will in￿ uence their capacity to borrow externally (broad lending
channel). A collapse in investment due to an exchange rate-induced fall in ￿rms￿
net wealth may outweigh competitiveness gains provided the Marshall-Lerner
condition is veri￿ed (Carranza, Gald￿n-SÆnchez and G￿mez-Biscarri, 2004).
It is worth mentioning that not only the level but also the variability of the
exchange rate is an important factor for trade and investment. Although the the
relationship between exchange rate volatility and aggregate or bilateral export
￿ ows seems to be ambiguous for developed countries, di⁄erentiating between
sectors suggests a negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and
export ￿ ows. Hence, the higher the exchange rate volatility, the more trade is
penalised, and consequently investment is a⁄ected. Nonetheless, the impact of
volatility di⁄ers both in magnitude and direction across sectors. For developing
countries, the literature unanimously supports the hypothesis that exchange
rate volatility has a negative e⁄ect on exports ￿ ows (for an overview, see, for
example, McKenzie, 1999).
5.4 Estimation Issues for Exchange Rate Pass-Through
A common practice in the literature is to estimate the exchange rate pass-
through either relying on VAR models or using a single equation approach in-
corporating di⁄erenced variables or employing single equations in which the
deviation from the long-run equilibrium exchange rate is modelled. We shall
touch upon each approach successively.
The VAR methodology typically makes use of a recursive VAR derived on
the basis of the distribution chain model devised by McCarthy (1999) (as in
equations 10 to 15 below) which starts with oil price in￿ ation ( ￿poil
t ), goes
through output gap ( ~ yt), exchange rate movements ( ￿et), import price in￿ ation
(￿p
import
t ), producer price in￿ ation ( ￿pPPI
t ) and ends up with consumer price
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The conditional expectations in equations (10) to (15) can then be approxi-
mated by linear projections of the lagged variables included in the system.
For transition economies, oil price in￿ ation is usually replaced by changes in
the price of commodities and the import price in￿ ation is not considered because
of data problems (Gueorguiev, 2003, Billmeier and Bonato, 2002, Bit￿ns, 2003).
These authors then assume implicitly complete pass-through to import prices.
In contrast, Ca￿ Zorzi, Hahn and Sanchez (2005) consider import and consumer
prices and include short-term interest rates in addition. Gueorguiev (2003)
extends the model with changes in total labour costs, following commodity
price in￿ ation in the second equation of the system. Korhonen and Wachtel
(2005) use a simpler VAR model, which contains oil price in￿ ation, foreign CPI
in￿ ation, changes in the exchange rate and domestic CPI in￿ ation in this order.
A second strand of the literature relies on a variant of the speci￿cation
suggested by Campa and Goldberg (2002):
pt = ￿ + ￿et + ￿p￿
t + ￿Zt + ￿t (16)
where p￿
t stands for foreign prices and Zt is a vector of control variables.
Because variables in equation (16) are usually I(1), most authors estimate an
ARDL representation:











￿ijzit￿j + ￿t (17)
with k, l and m being the maximum number of lags, n the number of control
variables. In this setting, short-term pass-through is given by ’o while the long-






￿j). Note that some authors use
a simpi￿ed version of (17). Campa and Golderg (2002) and Mihailov (2005) do
not include lagged values of the dependent variable41. Bailliu and Fujii (2004)
take foreign unit labour costs and output gap on board. Choudhry and Hakura
(2001) include only foreign prices but no other control variables while Rodzko
(2004) ignores both foreign prices and other control variables. Devereux and
Yetman (2003) use an even more rudimentary speci￿cation with only one lagged
exchange rate changes and a simultanous foreign price terms on the right-hand
side (￿pt = ’￿et￿1 + ￿￿p￿
t + ￿t). The only papers with a focus on transition
economies, which include control variables (output gap and real GDP) other
than foreign prices are Mihaljek and Klau (2001) and Dabusinskas (2003).




42Evidently, exchange rate pass-through is intimately related to equilibrium
exchange rates and to real misalignments. Both the VAR approach and the
above-noted single-equation approach largely ignore this issue, which may mean
there is an omitted variable bias which could have serious implications for the
estimated pass-through. For industrialised countries, it means that large non-
equilibrium deviations from PPP should be accounted for when analysing ex-
change rate pass-through (Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2005). The issue is possibly
even more important for transition countries because their equilibrium exchange
rates exhibit large changes, in particular a strong tend appreciation during the
phase of economic transformation42. Hence, the trending movement of the equi-
librium exchange rate and the deviation of the real exchange rate from this trend
should be clearly considered for the study of the pass-through. Darvas (2001)
stands out from the rest of the literature in that he models equilibrium exchange
rate and the degree of exchange rate pass-trough jointly. In particular, he ￿rst
estimates the equilibrium exchange rate using the single-equation Behavioural
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach. Next, prices and the nominal
exchange rate are estimated using the following system:
￿pt = ￿ + ￿￿et + ￿￿p￿
t + ￿(qt￿1 ￿ q
EQ
t￿1) + ￿t (18)
￿et = ￿ + ￿(qt￿1 ￿ q
EQ
t￿1) + ￿t (19)
where (qt￿1 ￿q
EQ
t￿1) measures the misalignment of the real exchange rate. In
this setting, ￿ represents the instantaneous long-run pass-through. Moreover,
Darvas (2001) allows for time-varying parameters in his speci￿cation given that
the pass-through may (and does according to his results) change over time.
5.4.1 Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Transition Economies
Short-term Interest Rates and the Exchange Rate An increasing num-
ber of papers have used the VAR methodology to study the impact of monetary
policy innovations on the most important macroeconomic variables. These pa-
pers, surveyed in more detail below, also address the impact of shocks in short-
term interest rates on the nominal exchange rate and produce mixed results
since positive interest rate shocks can lead to an appreciation or depreciation
of the exchange rate. The latter phenomenon is usually referred to as the ex-
change rate puzzle., which under special circumstances can be attributed to the
unsuccessful defence of a given exchange rate level.
Relying on a di⁄erent methodological framework, Rezessy (2004) shows that
for Hungary changes in the key policy rate led to systematic changes in the
exchange rate and he reports the absence of an exchange rate puzzle since a rise
in the policy rate causes the exchange rate to appreciate.
Central Bank Interventions in the Foreign Exchange Market It is
now becoming increasingly accepted that foreign exchange interventions may
42For an overview of this issue, see e.g. ￿gert, Halpern and MacDonald (2004).
43be more e⁄ective in emerging market economies as compared to well-established
industrialized countries for the following reasons (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003):
a.) central bank interventions are not always fully sterilized;
b.) the size of interventions is large relative to market turnover in narrow
forex markets;
c.) the market organization and the regulatory framework may be more
conducive to interventions;
d.) moral suasion may play a bigger role;
e.) because of the larger informational advantage of the central banks vis-￿-
vis market participants.
For the case of transition economies only a few papers study the e⁄ectiveness
of FX interventions using daily data43. It is meant under e⁄ectiveness that
central bank interventions in the FX market are capable of slowing down trends
(exchange rate smoothing) or even reversing the exchange rate trend (leaning
against the wind). Disyatat and Galati (2005) could not ￿nd any signi￿cant
impact of daily FX interventions on the exchange rate of the Czech koruna
using daily data from 2001 to 2002. Instead, interventions tend to increase FX
volatility.
However, Holub (2004) applies an event study approach to monthly data
and shows that interventions tend to be e⁄ective and on a number of occasions,
consistent with in￿ ation targeting. Also relying on the event study approach
￿but applied to daily data, and completed with GARCH estimations - ￿gert
and Komarek (2005) provide some additional supportive evidence in favour of
the fact that FX interventions slowed down the appreciation of the koruna from
1999 to 2002, especially when FX interventions were supported by interest rate
policy in a consistent manner.44 ￿gert and Lang (2005) also reveal that although
the Croatian National Bank was not particularly successful in in￿ uencing the
exchange rate during the late 1990s, o¢ cial FX interventions were fairly e⁄ective
in turning the trend on the FX markets from 2000 to 2004.
Exchange Rate Pass-Through to In￿ ation Table 4 summarises the aver-
age short-term and long-term exchange rate pass-through estimates45. Notwith-
standing the substantial shortcomings on the estimation side46, the average ex-
43BIS(2005) provides a collection of foreign exchange intervention practices in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and for a large number of emerging market
economies.
44The con￿ icting results obtained by Disyatat and Galati (2005) on the one hand,
and Holub (2004) and ￿gert and Komarek (2005) on the other hand might be due
to the omission of macroeconomic news from the event study approaches. However,
weak instruments may also cause the failure of Disyatat and Galati (2005) to ￿nd that
FX interventions are not successful. Their estimation results obtained from 2001 to
2002 may be considerably weakened by the fact that only three observations for FX
intervention are available for 2001.
45The individual studies dealing with the exchange rate pass-through in transition
economies and their speci￿c pass-through estimates are summarised in the annex.
46Another cautionary note is needed as some authors use sample periods going well
before the economic transition started in 1990. Campa and Goldberg (2002), Choudhri
and Hakura (2001) and Soto and Selaive (2003) employ data going back to the 1970s,
44change rate pass-through, reported in the row ￿average￿of Table 4 reveals the
incomplete nature of the pass-through from the exchange rate to prices, not only
in the short-run but also at a longer horizon. At the same time, Table 4 also
shows the term structure of the pass-through, which turns out to be highest
for import prices with an average pass-through of 62%. A 1% change in the
exchange rate results in an average 0.52% change in producer prices. Finally,
and as expected, the overall impact is the lowest on the consumer price index.
However, Table 2 and a closer look at the individual studies render this picture
much more varied for the following reasons:
1. cross-country heterogeneity of the pass-through especially for the CPI
2. the pass-through is di⁄erent for di⁄erent sub-groups of the CPI, PPI and
import prices
3. exchange rate pass-through has declined lately for almost all countries
4. the pass-through seems strongest against the anchor or benchmark cur-
rency
We shall tackle these issues one by one in what follows.
A ￿rst obvious observation is the large heterogeneity across countries regard-
ing pass-through to the CPI. CPI in￿ ation is less a⁄ected by the exchange rate
in the Czech Republic and is the highest in Slovenia (53%) and Bulgaria (68%).
The pass-through is also below the sample average for Romania (for the dollar).
In addition, two tentative observations can be made. Pass-through to the
CPI tends to be higher for countries at a lower stage of development (Korho-
nen and Wachtel, 2005). Also, we can observe larger pass-through for countries
with accommodative monetary policy at some stage (Slovenia and Romania).
If a country operates an explicit or implicit crawling peg exchange rate regime,
the pre-announced devaluation of the currency provides a nominal anchor for
expectations. As changes in the exchange rate may signal changes in prices,
changes in the exchange rate will generate corresponding changes in prices not
only for tradables but also for non-tradables, via the expectation channel. This
would imply a high and quite homogenous pass-through for the whole CPI. The
move towards more exchange rate ￿ exibility, coupled with an in￿ ation targeting
framework may break the link between the exchange rate and prices by discon-
necting primarily non-tradables from the exchange rate (Coricelli, Jacbec and
Masten, 2003; Darvas, 2001 and Kara et al, 2005).
However, studies focusing on one country sometimes strongly disagree re-
garding the size of the pass-through. One prominent example is Estonia: while
Dabu￿ inskas (2003) ￿nds a zero pass-through to the CPI47, Bitans (2004) re-
ports an average pass-through of 53%.
Second, Dobrynskaya and Levando (2005) identify for the Russian case higher
pass-through to food and good prices (around 50% and 30% in the long-run),
and virtually no pass-through to services. The ￿nding for food is broadly in line
while the sample period starts in 1988 for Hungary in Ca￿ Zorzi, Hahn and Sanchez
(2005).
47Given that the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed vis-￿-vis the euro in the currency
board arrangement, the pass-through measures how changes in the nominal e⁄ective
exchange rate are translated into in￿ ation.
45with Dabusinskas (2003) for Estonia. However, somewhat oddly, pass-through
is not present for goods in the Estonian CPI.
Mihaljek and Klau (2001) claims that using a measure of CPI cleaned from
non-market prices, such as administered and regulated prices increases the long-
run pass-through. Comparing their estimates for the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland with the rest of the sample veri￿es this assumption. Along these
lines, it turns out that the pass-through is biased downwards by roughly 10%
for Latvia when the price measure includes non-market prices (Bitans, 2004).
The pass-through appears to be larger against the anchor or reference cur-
rency. This point is clearly demonstrated for Romania (Gueorguiev, 2003 and
Korhonen and Wachtel, 2005), where pass-through is about twice as large
against the dollar than vis-￿-vis the euro. Inversely, changes in the dollar ex-
change rate matter little for prices in the Czech Republic and Hungary, for
instance.
The exchange rate pass-through is found to be higher higher for the PPI
as compared to the CPI for all countries except Croatia and Russia. Even for
the Czech Republic, with the lowest pass-through to the CPI, roughly 40% of
exchange rate changes are passed on to producer prices. For the remaining
countries, pass-through to PPI is usually above 50%. It is also more convenient
to take the market-based component of the PPI. While no pass-through could
be found on the basis of the overall PPI for Estonia, PPI for manufacturing
(net of energy, mining prices for instance) re￿ ects a large amount of changes in
the e⁄ective exchange rate. Overall, producer prices of manufactured goods, in
particular, machinery and equipment, are more receptive with regard to changes
in the exchange rate than other items.
The pass-through to the price of imported goods is nearly complete in Es-
tonia, Hungary and Poland and it is complete in Slovakia, while it below the
pass-through to the PPI for Latvia and Lithuania and Slovenia. Although a
similar degree of heterogeneity can be found for sub-groups of imported goods,
pass-through is highest in machinery equipments, followed by other manufac-
tured and chemical goods.
A criticism of the above work lies in its failure to address possible asym-
metries in the pass-through. The pass-through could be di⁄erent depending on
whether the exchange rate depreciations, appreciates or not, whether changes
in the exchange rate exceed a certain threshold (are large enough) or how much
the exchange rate deviates from its equilibrium level. The exploration of these
issues awaits future research.
5.4.2 Exchange Rate Pass-Through and the Labour Market
It is interesting to note the role labour market adjustments may play in the ex-
change rate pass-through. Jakab and KovÆcs (2003) perform model (NIGEM)-
based simulations in order to analyse the relative roles of factors a⁄ecting ex-
change rate pass-through. What emerges from their simulations is that expec-
tations and goods markets explain most of the pass-through in the short- and
medium-run. In contrast, adjustments in labour markets driven by changes in
46the exchange rate start having some e⁄ect on domestic prices only with a de-
lay of three years and more. This is because the labour market ￿rst reacts in
terms of quantities (employment/unemployment), and only over time in terms
of prices (wages). In the event of a simulated nominal appreciation, it turns
out that the negative output gap caused by a real appreciation of the domes-
tic currency ￿rst increases unemployment. Rising unemployment subsequently
puts downward pressure on wages, which is ￿nally felt in domestic prices. The
total amount by which changes in the exchange rate feeds into prices via the
labour market depends on how much the response of wages to an increase in
unemployment is, i.e. how ￿ exible the labour market is.
5.4.3 Determinants of Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Although several authors have linked the size of the pass-through to the level of
in￿ ation (Darvas, 2001) and to the type of the exchange rate regime (Coricelli
et al., 2003), the only study which performed a cross-sectional analysis is Bitans
(2004), who shows for a sample of transition economies that the size of the
exchange rate pass-through is strongly linked to
1.) the rate of in￿ ation,
2.) exchange rate persistence,
3.) import structure (measured as the share of machinery and electronic
equipment in total imports of goods, and to some extent, to
4.) openness.
Overall, although the pass-through may have increased up to mid- or late-
1990s (Campa and Goldberg, 2002), it seems to be falling since then as con-
vincingly evidenced by Bitans (2004) who argues this ￿nding is closely related
to the decline in in￿ ation rates.
An interesting ￿nding is that the pass-through for manufactured goods tends
to be higher than for raw materials both for import and for producer prices
(Rodzko, 2004). This could invalidate the composition e⁄ect put forth by
Campa and Goldberg (2002).
47Table 4 Summary of the Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Import prices PPI CPI
short-run long-run short-run long-run short-run long-run
Average of the sample
Average 0.44 0.70 0.16 0.52 0.31 0.33
Country-speci￿c averages
CEE-5
Czech Rep. 0.34 0.65 ￿ 0.41 0.10 0.23
Hungary 0.58 0.87 ￿ 0.57 0.38 0.30
Poland 0.57 0.84 ￿ 0.60 ￿ 0.31
Slovakia 0.41 1.01 ￿ 0.73 ￿ 0.35
Slovenia 0.26 0.40 ￿ 0.78 0.20 0.53
Baltic Three
Estonia 0.59 0.83 ￿ 0.47 0.00 0.35
Latvia 0.43 0.45 ￿ 0.66 ￿ 0.39
Lithuania 0.22 0.32 ￿ 0.55 0.07 0.32
SEE
Bulgaria ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.94 ￿ 0.68
Croatia ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.17 ￿ 0.22
Romania
(EFF/EUR) ￿ ￿ 0.22 0.48 0.06 0.21
(USD) ￿ ￿ 0.23 0.53 0.28 0.42
CIS
Russia ￿ ￿ 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.40
Ukraine ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.44
Note: The averages are based on nonnegative pass-through estimates. Negative pass-through
estimates were set to zero. The average of country speci￿c averages does not equal the ￿gure
given in the row ￿Average,￿ as the sample speci￿c average is obtained as the average of all
available pass-through estimates. EFF, EUR and USD indicate the pass-through from the
e⁄ective exchange rate and from the euro and dollar exchange rates, respectively.
5.4.4 Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade Flows
The in￿ uence of exchange rate volatility on exports has been studied in ￿gert
and Morales-Zumaquero (2005) for a number of Central and Eastern European
countries. On the basis of standard export equations, augmented with FDI,
the panel estimations indicate that a rise in forex volatility, measured either
directly or via changes in the exchange rate regime hinders exports, and that this
negative impact is transmitted with some delay rather than being instantaneous.
It turns our that sectors, such as chemicals and di⁄erent types of manufacturing
adding up to 80% of total exports su⁄er most from increased exchange rate
volatility. Nevertheless, country-speci￿c time series estimations reveal a great
deal of heterogeneity across countries. For instance, there is little or weak
evidence in favour of a negative relation between forex volatility and exports
Slovenia, Russia and Romania, while for Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary
48and Poland, the estimation results provide reasonably robust evidence on the
detrimental e⁄ect of forex volatility on exports.
6 Asset Price Channel
Monetary policy is also capable of in￿ uencing asset prices, such as equity and
housing. From a monetarist viewpoint, in the event that an expansionary mon-
etary policy results in increased money supply, the actual level of liquidity held
by the public will exceed their desired level. This, in turn, leads market par-
ticipants to seek to decrease liquidity at their disposal by buying equity, bonds
and housing which results in a rise in the respective prices. An increase in bond
prices is automatically translated into a decrease in the interest rate, already
under pressure through the interest rate channel. Falling interest rates will then
increase the attractiveness of equities fuelling equity purchases and causing eq-
uity prices to rise further. However, asset price reactions to monetary policy
action can be asymmetric in nature. For instance, Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2004) show for the US that the reaction of stock prices to a change in the
interest rate is ampli￿ed if the change in the interest rate is unexpected48, if
the change goes in the other direction than in the previous period (decrease
following an increase or vica versa) and in the presence of high stock market
volatility.
6.1 The Non-Financial Corporate Sector
Higher equity prices eventually exert an in￿ uence on investment spending by
altering the relationship between the cost of capital and the stock market valu-
ation of that capital. This mechanism is described by Tobin￿ s q theory, where
q is de￿ned as the market value of ￿rms over the replacement cost of capital.
Similarly, an increase in equity prices also a⁄ects households￿spending via the
wealth e⁄ect.. The basic idea in the q story is that as q rises above unity ￿rms
￿nd their market value is high relative to the replacement cost of capital and
therefore new investments are cheaper relative to the market value of ￿rms. As
a consequence, issuing fewer new shares at high prices enables ￿rms to buy more
new equipment at lower prices and this results in higher investment spending.
The q theory is also applicable to the housing market. For example, a higher-
than-unity q implies market value above replacement cost, and this promotes
construction production. Conversely, if q is below 1, ￿rms would not seek to
buy new equipment because it is more advantageous to acquire other ￿rms with
market value less than their replacement cost of capital. Likewise, it is more
favourable to buy old houses instead of constructing new ones. As a result,
investment, household spending and construction activity decrease.
48The strong form of the e¢ cient market hypothesis holds that asset prices incor-
porate all available information (even that publicly not available). Hence, only the
unexpected component of the change can have an in￿ uence on asset prices.
49The empirical literature on Tobin￿ s q focuses on whether investment is corre-
lated more with stock markets than with fundamentals (such as sales, cash-￿ ow,
pro￿ts or net present value of pro￿ts). While some authors ￿nd that investment
follows closely fundamentals (Blanchard, Rhee and Summers, 1993), and that
it is arguably di¢ cult to relate Tobin￿ s q to the evolution of investment because
of problems encountered when measuring the replacement cost of capital, there
appears to be a broad consensus in the literature that stock prices and market
valuation matter, to some extent, for investment decisions (Alexandre, 2002).
If market valuation plays a role in investment decisions, large ￿ uctuations in
asset prices unrelated to fundamentals, which lead to over- or undervaluation of
asset prices, can cause over- or under-investment49 This raises the question of
whether monetary policy should respond to asset price bubbles. The question is
all the more relevant since asset price booms and busts are observed to occur on
a regular basis (Filardo, 2004). According to Bernanke and Gertler (2000), mon-
etary policy should react to asset prices only if they in￿ uence expected future
in￿ ation. It is also argued that reacting to asset prices may induce increased
in￿ ation volatility. However, Alexandre (2002) demonstrates that reacting to
non-fundamental shocks to asset prices leads not only to more stability in in￿ a-
tion and asset prices, but also to more stable investment and thus, ultimately,
to more stable output. Filardo (2004) argues that monetary policy should step
in only in the event that an asset price bubble has macroeconomic implications
(￿macroeconomic￿asset price bubble). Although it may prove tricky to identify
and to react to such bubbles, Cecchetti et al. (2000) consider uncertainty not to
exceed that prevailing for other parts of the monetary transmission mechanism.
In addition, bubbles in di⁄erent asset markets may be related to one another,
which makes it even more di¢ cult to deal with them properly. It is a stylised
fact that the collapse of stock market bubbles is typically followed by a surge
in property prices, largely as a consequence of a monetary loosening to ease the
e⁄ects the burst on the equity market. Hence, ￿bubbles beget bubbles via a
policy channel￿(Filardi, 2004).
6.2 Households
The wealth e⁄ect channel of equity and property prices is closely related to
Modigliani￿ s lifecycle theory (Modigliani (1971) in which households￿consump-
tion spending is believed to be driven by disposable lifetime wealth. Because
equity and property is part of this wealth, a rise (fall) in equity and housing
prices triggered by monetary policy action results in increasing (diminishing)
lifetime wealth and thus leads to an increase (decrease) in consumption spend-
ing.
An alternative view to the wealth e⁄ect is the so-called liquidity e⁄ect. In
line with Mishkin (2001), spending on durable goods and housing is by a large
49The fundamental component of asset prices re￿ ects fundamentals such as the net
present value of pro￿ts or dividends and hence does not cause fundamentals. In con-
trast, the non-fundamental part of asset prices leads to distortions in investment de-
cisions, and, thus it causes fundamentals (Filardo, 2004).
50extent in￿ uenced by consumers￿perception regarding the likelihood of running
into ￿nancial di¢ culties. The higher the ratio of liquid ￿nancial assets to debt,
the lower the probability of ￿nancial distress will be. Thus, an increase in equity
prices decreases the danger of future problems related to debt and therefore
encourages households to consume more goods and housing.
6.3 Spillover from or to Other Channels in the Transmis-
sion Mechanism
The asset price channel interferes with other channels of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism, and hence may amplify the overall transmission, mainly
through the broad lending channel. A rise (fall) in the price of an asset (such
as a stock, bond and housing) triggered by monetary policy action strengthens
(weakens) the balance sheet of ￿rms and households. This, in turn, increases
(lowers) their capacity to borrow from external sources via the external ￿nancing
premium.
If the credit channel is operational, then an increase (decrease) in interest
rates can lead to a drop (rise) in the stock price of ￿rms which are subject
to ￿nancial constraint because such ￿rms are unable to supply their preferred
amount of goods and services, so their expected future pro￿ts fall. This e⁄ect,
in turn, has a feedback on the credit channel since a change in stock prices
changes the external ￿nancing premium of the ￿rm and of ￿rms and households
(plus wealth e⁄ect) that hold the shares of the ￿rm.
A change in the monetary policy stance can also lead to ￿rms￿share prices
becoming more heterogeneous. The market valuation of those ￿rms will change
more, which produce interest-sensitive goods or services as a change in interest
rates modi￿es the demand for their goods and services (interest rate channel,
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004). In a second stage, such ￿rms are more exposed
to the credit channel.
7 Systematic versus Shocking E⁄ects of Mone-
tary Policy
The literature reviewed thus far relates to the systematic e⁄ects of monetary
policy actions on in￿ ation and the real economy. However, VAR studies provide
a (black-box) framework in which the impact of monetary policy shocks on
prices, output and macroeconomic variables can be quanti￿ed. This section
summarises the main issues of this literature, namely the prize puzzle and then
presents the empirical ￿ndings for the CEECs.
7.1 Price Puzzle I.
A huge amount of e⁄ort has been devoted to uncovering the impact of an un-
expected monetary policy shock on output and in￿ ation. This literature has
produced the so-called ￿price puzzle￿ according to which a monetary policy
51contraction causes a rise in the in￿ ation rate rather than a drop. While some
authors quali￿ed only the response of prices non-sensual and went on inter-
preting the reaction of the other variables to the shock, the vast majority of
researchers have argued that the price puzzle invalidates all the other responses
as well. In this spirit, several suggestions have been proposed to deal with this
problem50.
A ￿rst group of papers, including that of Sims (1992), claimed that the for-
ward looking component of the monetary policy shock might have been misiden-
ti￿ed, and the inclusion of commodity prices in the system makes the puzzle
disappear. The underlying idea of this line of thinking is that policy makers
in central banks also look at variables, disregarded by academic studies, which
help in forecasting in￿ ation. Yet VAR models extended in this manner usually
include only up to 8 or 10 variables, which represents only a small proportion of
the information set available to policymakers. The combination of factor analy-
sis with VAR models, giving rise to factor-augmented VARs (FAVAR), provides
a remedy to this problem. In such a setting, a small number of factors (prin-
cipal components) summarises the information extracted from a large number
(perhaps over 100) of time series (Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, 2005).
However, Giordani (2004) and Hanson (2004) argue that variables good at
predicting in￿ ation (such as accurate in￿ ation forecasts) are not helpful in solv-
ing the price puzzle. Giordani (2004) emphasises the need to use the output
gap as a remedy for the puzzle. Indeed, commodity prices may help to mitigate
the puzzle only because they are correlated with the US business cycle. Hanson
(2004) shows that the price puzzle is due to the fact that the estimated VAR
models cover periods during which there is a change in the monetary policy rule.
Once the period is carefully hand-picked to remove overlaps between di⁄erent
monetary policy rules, the price puzzle disappears.
Another strand of the literature, initiated by Barth and Ramey (2000) take
the position that the price puzzle is not generated by methodological problems.
Instead, prices tend to rise in the wake of a monetary policy tightening because
an increase in interest rates gives rise to higher production costs re￿ ected in
higher in￿ ation rate. They ￿nd that the so-called cost-channel was more im-
portant during the 1960s and 1970s and then declined during the 1980s and
the 1990s in the US economy51. For small open economies, the price puzzle is
likely to arise if the nominal exchange rate is not included in the VAR (Kim
and Roubini, 2000).
50A more fundamental criticism of the VAR literature formulated by Bernanke,
Gertler and Watson(1997) and McCallum (1999) is that VAR models capture only
the unanticipated changes in monetary policy rather that the systematic relationships,
which connects monetary policy instruments and the economy. Accounting for long-
run relations is all the more import as the unexpected component of monetary policy
represents only a small fraction of changes in monetary policy (McCallum, 1999).
51As they put, unexpected monetary policy shocks can be best viewed as a combi-
nation of cost (supply) shocks and demand shocks.
527.2 Price Puzzle II.
Another type of price puzzle seems to emerge for emerging market economies.
In these countries, a monetary restriction causes a rise in in￿ ation if public debt
is high. According to this view, a monetary policy tightening re￿ ected in higher
real interest rates increases the probability that the government will default
as a consequence of higher interest payments. Hence, the risk premium rises,
and this pushes foreign capital to leave the country, which, in turn, causes the
exchange rate to depreciate. If exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices is
high enough, such a depreciation leads to rising in￿ ation (Blanchard, 2004 and
Favero and Giavazzi, 2004)5253.
7.3 Exchange Rate Puzzle
Mojon and Peersman (2001) detect an exchange rate depreciation in the after-
math of a monetary policy innovation for Italy and Spain, which had trouble in
defending their exchange rate in 1993. This so-called exchange rate puzzle
can be traced back to the fact that monetary policy reacted with an increase
in the short-term interest rates, mostly in vein. This also helps in explaining
the price puzzle because nominal exchange rate depreciation feeds into domestic
in￿ ation (exchange rate pass-through). Nonetheless, if monetary policy shocks
are in fact a response to changes in the exchange rate, then the issue at hand is
the misidenti￿cation of monetary policy shocks leading to a basic dismissal of
the results.
7.4 Empirical Findings for Industrialised Countries
Recently, considerable e⁄ort has been undertaken to scrutinise heterogeneities
in the monetary transmission mechanism to a monetary policy innovation be-
tween the US economy and the euro area are during the 1990s. This research,
summarised in Angeloni et al. (2003), indicates that the price puzzle may be
absent in the euro area, while a small increase in prices can be observed in the
US immediately after monetary tightening. This is presumably due to the fact
that the cost channel tends to be small in the US during the 1990s but is even
less important for the euro area (Rabanal, 2003). In the longer run, prices tend
to fall, gradually but permanently in the euro area as well as in the US. A second
￿nding is that output reacts in a similar way in both economic entities. It ￿rst
drops but then recovers gradually (humped shaped reaction). Nevertheless, the
real di⁄erence between the euro area and the US is that output responses are
determined more by household consumption rather than by investment in the
52Recall that Burstein et al. (2002, 2004) show that the in￿ ationary e⁄ect of a large
devaluation will be limited because of the distribution related component of goods
sold to the consumers and because of the switch from imported goods to domestic
substitutes.
53The price puzzle was developed in the context of Brazil. It also applies to the case
of other large emerging markets such as Turkey (Aktas et al., 2005).
53US, while the opposite appears to be the case in the euro area. This hetero-
geneity, also termed the ￿output composition puzzle￿ results, Angeloni et al.
(2003) argue, from di⁄erences in households￿reaction. At the same time, ￿rms
respond in a more homogenous manner to monetary policy shocks in the Us and
the euro area.
VAR studies unveil the asymmetric e⁄ects of a monetary policy shock both
over the business cycle and across sectors. It appears that euro area countries
are more responsive to monetary policy shocks in recessions than in good times
(Peersman and Smets, 2001, 2002). Monetary policy shocks also turn out to
impact sectors in an asymmetric way. Peersman and Smets (2002) point out that
sectors producing durable goods, with more capital intensity and being more
open tend to react more to monetary policy shocks. This is indeed evidence for
the interest rate channel. Dedola and Lippi (2000) partly con￿rm this ￿nding.
But they also uncover that manufacturing sectors including a larger number of
small or more leveraged ￿rms (lower smaller borrowing capacity) react stronger
to monetary policy shocks than other sectors.
7.5 Empirical Findings for CEECs
Heterogeneity in results is an accompanying phenomenon of the ever growing
number of VAR studies with a focus on the CEECs. According to Table 5,
which reports the main conclusions of the individual papers, di⁄erent and ap-
parently inconsistent results can be found for a given country. In this sense,
the price puzzle, a permanent decline or a temporary fall in the in￿ ation rate
after a monetary policy contraction can be obtained for the same country. Also,
output may increase, decline permanently or exhibit a humped shape following
a monetary policy shock. However, it turns out that studies covering the entire
transition period54 starting in the early 1990s, and relying on recursive VAR
models (EFN, 2004; Creel and Levasseur, 2005; HØricourt, 2005) tend to obtain
price puzzle. In contrast, papers allowing for changes in the parameter esti-
mates either through splitting the whole sample into sub-samples (Arnostova
and Hurn￿k, 2004; VonnÆk, 2005) or by relying on genuine time-varying coe¢ -
cient estimates (Darvas, 2005) or by employing a more sophisticated and hence
more precise identi￿cation scheme of monetary policy innovation (VonnÆk, 2005;
Jaroci· nki, 2005). The price puzzle in the Czech Republic may be due to the
emergence of the exchange rate puzzle during the 1997 period (Arnostova and
Hurn￿k, 2004). Jaroci· nski (2005) compares the mean of the impulse-reponse
functions of 4 CEE economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) to
that of ￿ve euro area countries (Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain)
and ￿nds that the reaction of prices and output to monetary policy shocks is
stronger in the CEECs than in the euro area.
In sum, as put forth by Elbourne and de Haan (2003) for industrialised
54Quite surprising is the fact that EFN (2004) estimates a VAR for Hungary for a
period starting in 1985. Obviously, it is di¢ cult to obtain meaningful results when a
period covers the end of central planning, the early and later stages of the transition
process.
54countries, the main sources of cross-study heterogeneity in results are a.) the
di⁄erent time period, b.) the use of di⁄erent schemes to identify monetary
policy shocks and c.) the use of a di⁄erent set of variables55.
55HØricourt (2005) also argues that it does matter whether one employs industrial
production or GDP ￿gures for output.




CZ, full period: foreign exchange and price puzzle, output: U-shaped
1998, price and output: U-shaped, no foreign exchange puzzle
Bitans et al. (2003) LV, prices: slow decrease and then slow recovery
Creel and
Levasseur (2005)
In￿ation: price puzzle for all countries
Output increases for 1999 to 2004, no reaction for HU
Darvas (2005)
Price puzzle in CZ (1998, 2004), HU (1994, 1998), drop in prices in PL
Output: drops most in PL, least in HU, but recovers more quickly in PL
than in HU; Response pro￿les change over time
EFN (2004)
Mostly not signi￿cant (EE, SI, LT)
In￿ation: CZ price puzzle, HU, LV U-shaped, SK permanent decrease (Q),
U-shaped (M), PL no signi￿cant change (Q, M)




CEE-10; in￿ation: largest and quickest drop in SK and RO; PL,
CZ protracted, others small;HU: price puzzle
Output: large and quick drop; CZ mostly quick; SK and EE slow
Ganev et al. (2002)
In￿ation: SI, CZ permanent rise, LV, SK temporary fall, HU permanent fall
Output: decrease is fastest in HU, more permanent in CZ, decreases and
adjustment in SK and SI, increases in the remaining countries;
BG, RO: large ￿uctuations
HØricourt (2005)
In￿ation: CZ, price and ⁄oreign exchange puzzle; HU, SI price puzzle
Output: CZ, GDP and IIP di⁄erent
EE, PL, SK: no signi￿cant change
Jaroci· nski (2005) CEE-4: decline in output and prices
Kuijs (2001
M2 shock: SK, increase in in￿ation (unit labor cost increase),
little impact on output.
Maliszewski (1999)
In￿ation: PL declines and recovers partially
Output: PL declines and recovers partially (more strongly than in￿ation)
Maliszewski (2002)
In￿ation: CZ, PL slow decline and stabilization at lower level
Output: CZ, PL hump-shaped, but not full recovery
VonnÆk (2005)
HU: 1992 to 2003 price puzzle
HU: 1995 to 2003 quick decline in output, slow decline in prices,
currency appreciation
Wr￿bel (2001)
Prices: PL increase followed by decrease and slight recovery, but still negative
Output: PL increase followed by decrease and full recovery
Credit: PL large decrease followed by slow recovery
Note:CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SI denote the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The CEE-10 includes these countries and
Bulgaria. The CEE-4 covers CZ, HU, PL and SI. Q and M refer to quarterly and monthly frequencies.
568 Concluding Remarks
We now look at determinants of the di⁄erent channels, set out in earlier parts
of the paper, which may give us some clues on the past and possibly future
development of the di⁄erent channels. Starting with the very ￿rst step of the
transmission mechanism, we have seen that the pass-through improved substan-
tially from the beginning of the transition until today both in terms of the speed
of adjustment towards long-term pass through and the size of the long-run pass-
through. This is mostly because of the development of the ￿nancial and banking
sectors in the countries.
Speculating for the future from the macroeconomic side, money market
volatility is bound to fall to euro area levels after euro adoption and ￿nan-
cial depth is likely to be rising in the years to come. At the same time, in￿ ation
rates are closing the gap to the in￿ ation rate of the euro area and long-run GDP
growth may also slow down as real convergence progresses. The ￿rst two fac-
tors work towards an increase in the pass-through while the next two variables
could decrease it. As to the structure of the banking sector, countries such as
Poland, Slovenia and Latvia have less foreign investors in the banking sector,
partly due to fewer advances in banking sector reforms. Poland and Slovenia
are the countries with the highest burden of non-performing loans and Slovenia
has the lowest capital adequacy ratio, but still comparable to the euro area. All
this is admittedly detrimental to the pass-through. So, by making e⁄orts on the
front of banking reforms, these countries would be able to enhance interest rate
pass-through. However, market concentration has been recently on the rise in
most of the countries. Very high concentration rates can be observed in Estonia
and Lithuania, while concentration is lowest in Hungary and Poland. Generally,
market concentrations higher than in the euro area and yet on the rise makes us
believe that interest rate pass-through may slow down and become less complete
in the future in these countries.
We summarise the issue of exchange rate pass-through. Although trade and
import exposure rose sharply in all countries except for Slovenia, the exchange
rate pass-through has decreased over time and is expected to be stabilising at
a lower level. The main reason for this is the steady fall in in￿ ation rates to
very low levels, perhaps with the exception of Romania and Russia, and the
abandonment of accommodative monetary policies. The composition e⁄ect,
measured as an increase in the share of manufactured goods in total imports,
is fairly substantial in all countries, with the exception of Slovenia. However,
its role is not clear-cut given that the pass-through for these groups of goods is
found to be higher on occasions than for more homogeneous goods. Even so, and
because of an expected decline in in￿ ation and exchange rate volatilities, which
are relatively high at present, the exchange rate channel will loose, if it has
not lost already, its prominent role in the monetary transmission mechanism.
However, changes in the exchange rate may have a strong impact on the balance
sheet of ￿rms and households, if there is a currency mismatch between revenues
and expenditures. Currency mismatch may be an issue because of the recent
surge in foreign currency denominated household loans and, to a lesser extent,
57loans to the corporate sector. After euro adoption, the e⁄ect of the pass.through
will be coming directly from trade with countries outside the euro area, and
indirectly via the direct impact of the major currencies￿￿ uctuations against
the euro (euro/yen, euro/GBP and euro/USD) on the main euro area trading
partners such as Germany, France and Italy.
The asset price channel is still of limited importance and is probably going
to remain a low pro￿le transmission channel. Stock and bond markets matter
little to investment and consumption decisions through the wealth and income
e⁄ects, given that these markets are dominated massively by foreign investors
rather than by domestic ones. As a consequence, price movements on these
markets have limited impact on the domestic economy via these two e⁄ects.
Even though the e⁄ect of monetary policy via the property market appears to
be not very important for the time being, this channel may grow more powerful
in the future with the dynamic development of borrowing related to housing.
The limited role of the capital market does not only manifest for the asset
prices channel but has also important implications for the credit channel. Ob-
viously, new funds raised on both stock and bond markets is virtually close to
zero in the CEECs, as only a very limited number of companies get listed on the
stock market and as bond markets are used for ￿nancing public debt. This is
unlikely to change in the near future. As a consequence, one may think that the
￿nancing of the non-￿nancial corporate sector transmits through the banking
sector.However, it is doubtful that the credit channel has a signi￿cant role to
play in the CEECs either. First, the high concentration of the banking sectors,
the heavy involvement of foreigners, the high degree of liquidity and more than
su¢ cient levels of bank capitalisation render banks less responsive to domestic
monetary policy impulses. Second, notwithstanding the absence of well func-
tioning capital markets, ￿rms may escape from domestic credit markets either
by borrowing in foreign currency or by relying on trade credit and other kinds
of inter-￿rm loans relating to transnational network created by FDI.
The good news for the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy is, however, that
￿rms capable of escaping domestic monetary policy conditions are strongly in-
￿ uenced by monetary policy in the euro area either because foreign currency
loans are denominated in euros, or because their parent institutions are them-
selves subjected to the credit channel in the euro area. However, the good news
would be really good if monetary conditions for the average of the euro area
would be appropriate and not too loose for the transition economies as well.
When looking at the recipient sectors and the distribution of small and large
￿rms across sectors, it appears that the manufacturing sector is less subject to
the credit channel as compared to the rest of the economy, in particular to the
services sectors. First, FDI ￿ owed more than proportionately into the manufac-
turing sector. Second, small ￿rms are mostly concentrated in non-tradables. To
put the argument the other way around, the credit channel is likely to be oper-
ational for the market-based non-tradable sector and may have a strong impact
on this part of the economy. Even though services account for about 70% of
GDP in most countries, the country-speci￿c impact is heterogeneous depending
on how large the contribution of small ￿rms to GDP is and how large public
58involvement in non-tradable sectors is (see Annex C).
In addition, households have no choice but to rely on bank borrowing. We
will inevitably see the emergence and a subsequent strengthening of the credit
channel for households with a build-up of the stock of household loans. How-
ever, monetary policy will a⁄ect this segment of the economy only partially and
relatively slowly given that the interest rate pass-through is the lowest and most
sluggish for consumer loans. As we have argued, the interest rate pass-through
may slow down in the course of the coming years. This may indeed further
cushion the impact of monetary policy through the credit channel.
Finally, while the credit channel is likely to be at work, or to gain importance
in the non-tradable sector and for households, the interest rate channel may have
a larger impact on the manufacturing sector. The ￿nal impact of monetary
policy on output and prices of the manufacturing sector depends crucially on
how parts of manufacturing react to changes in the interest rate. Although
the share of manufacturing is pretty stable around 20% for all countries under
study, its composition di⁄ers to a large extent. For instance, food production
occupies an important role in Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, while the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia excel in producing electrical, optical and
transport equipment. To the extent that these sectors di⁄er in terms of mark-
up (high or low mark-up sectors), they may have di⁄erent reactions in di⁄erent
channels, as we set out this issue earlier. Hence, a heterogeneous response of
these sectors to monetary policy innovations may generate substantial cross-
country heterogeneity to monetary policy impulses.
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70Annex A
Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Table A1. Characteristics of Individual Studies
71Table A2. Exchange Rate Pass-Through Estimates for Import Prices (Import Unit Value Indices)
72Table A2. Exchange Rate Pass-Through Estimates for the PPI
73Table A2. Exchange Rate Pass-Through Estimates for the CPI
74Credit Channel in Transition Economies
Table A3. Summary of Studies Relating to the Credit Channel
in Transition Economies
Notes: EE, CR, PL and UA refer to Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine.
CEEC8 includes CEEC5+3 Baltic countries. MMR= money market rate.
Table A4. Summary of VAR Studies
Notes: I= interest rate; E=exchange rate, Y(IP)=output(industrial production), P=in￿ation.
75Annex B
Table B1. Factors Amplifying or Attenuating the Interest Rate Pass-Through, 2004
Source: In￿ation and GDP growth: Eurostat/NewCronos, MM volatility is money market volatility
based on the relative standard deviation of monthly observations for 1-month money market interest
rates from 2002 to 2004. Private credit to GDP: World Bank Development Indocators (WDI) 2005, banking
sector concentration: ECB (2005): EU Banking Structures, October, except for Bulgaria, Croatia and
Romania: WDI 2005. Data on foreign banks, state ownership and bad loans are obtained from the EBRD
Transition Report (2004)
a 2003
Table B2. Factors Amplifying or Attenuating the Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Sources: WIIW Handbook of Statistics 2005, NewCronos/Eurostat.
Notes: Composition e⁄ect is measured as an increase in the share of manufactured goods in total imports
between 1990 and 2004 (except for Slovakia: 1991-2004; Bulgaria: 1992-2004; Romania: 1993-2004. In￿ation
and FX volatility are based on the standard deviation of monthly observations for year-on year changes in the
in￿ation and the exchange rate (EUR) from 2002 to 2004.
MF=managed ￿oat, FF=free ￿oat, P=tight peg, P15=peg with a band of +/-15%, CB=currency board
76Table B3. Factors In￿ uencing the Asset Price Channel
Source: WDI (2004), ECB (2005)
Table B4. Factors Amplifying or Attenuating the Credit Channel
Note: S implies a strengthening of the credit channel, while W refers
to a weakening of the credit channel.
77Table B4-A. Credit Channel ￿Credit to the Economy
Source: ECB (2005)
Table B4-B. Credit Channel ￿The Role of SMEs
Source: World Bank.
Notes: Micro, small and medium SMEs are de￿ned as having 0-9, 10-49 and 50-249 employees,
respectively. De￿ntions defer for Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Uzbekistan, which renders
full comparability di¢ cult. The data refer to 2001 except for Russia and Uzbekistan (2003).
M=manufacturing, C=construction, T=trade, S=services.
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